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 Coordination, and the mechanisms by which coordination occurs, represents a significant 
area of study for economic research, and information technology. Technology enhances 
communication in both speed and quantity of information and when aligned with appropriate 
tasks can improve decision-making and task performance. Examining the effect of technology 
based coordination mechanisms on market platforms provides insight into outcomes as 
represented by buyer surplus and task completion as well as behaviors, such as network structure 
and emotional attitudes in economic experiments. Drawing on theory from economics and 
information systems, larger buyer groups should be able to obtain better prices and extract higher 
surplus from sellers, and in the presence of higher levels of communication, buyers should be 
better able to coordinate their actions, yielding higher surpluses as predicted by countervailing 
power theory. However, increased communication, while allowing for more collaboration, 
requires increased coordination. Thus, while larger groups should get better outcomes the 
complexity of forming groups proves challenging. The increased levels of communication create 
“noise” which hinders the time it takes to complete tasks thereby suppressing buyer profits. 




these lower prices were found in the establishment of intermediaries, through countervailing 
power theory. However, individual consumers could never exercise this power, because 
coordination and communication costs were too high.  
 This dissertation tests countervailing power theory under a specific economic market, 
group buying suited for interdependent tasks. An experimental simulation is created that tests the 
effects of different levels of communication and group size, and examines the results of buyer 
surplus and time to task completion as well as their interaction effects. The experiment also 
examines the structural nature of the group-buying network and analyzes the rich qualitative data 
for insight into the role of emotions in group buying. The results could be used to further design 
additional experimental simulations to tests these classic economic theories while provide insight 
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Coordination, and the mechanisms by which coordination occurs, represents a significant 
area of study for economic research, and information technology (Malone and Crowston, 1994; 
Clemons and Row, 1992). Clearly, technology enhances communication in both speed and 
quantity of information and when aligned with appropriate tasks can improve decision-making 
and task performance (Dennis et al., 2008). Examining the effect of technology based 
coordination mechanisms on market platforms should yield interesting results. This research 
seeks to examine outcomes and behaviors through the creation of a technology based group 
buying economic experiment.  
Drawing on theory from economics and information systems, larger buyer groups should 
be able to obtain better prices and extract higher surplus from sellers, and that more 
communication capacity should help buyers with coordinating their actions. However, increased 
communication, while allowing for more collaboration, requires increased coordination. Thus, 
while larger groups should get better outcomes the complexity of forming groups may prove to 
be difficult.  The increased ability to communicate may also hinder the time it takes to complete 
tasks. Galbraith (1952) explained that increased cooperation among buyers would lower prices, 
but that these lower prices were found in the establishment of intermediaries, through 
countervailing power theory. However, individual consumers could never exercise this power, 
because coordination and communication costs were too high. Technology greatly enables 
individual consumers to communicate and exert pressure on sellers, and thus it may be found that 
consumers can exercise this power through newer technologies such as social media, and 




 Social buying, or group buying, presents a new form of social commerce (Liang and 
Turban, 2012) and has attracted a fair amount of attention from business worldwide since early 
2000s. Industry examples of group-buying businesses include early ventures like Mercata, which 
ceased operation by 2004, as well as more recent ones like Living Social and Groupon. The 
nascent market of online group buying is still evolving and companies continue to innovate both 
new group-buying technology platforms and business models. The market has grown strongly 
over the past few years, in particular in the United States and China. For example, Groupon, 
which was founded in 2008, has gone through a rapid rise, expanding business globally and 
generating $1.6b revenue in 2011, but at the same time has also been struggling to find a 
sustainable business model (Anand and Aron, 2003).  By focusing on the design of the 
technology platform, from the perspective of the buyers, outcomes and behaviors can further be 
studied and the potential value of introducing a new social technology feature on a group-buying 
platform can be explored.   
 The theoretical foundation of IT-enabled coordination motivates the current study. The 
creation of a technology based social buying experimental market allows us to view and examine 
the effect social communication on group-buying platforms as a form of an IT-enabled 
coordination mechanism. 
Historically, various IT-enabled coordination innovations have had a profound impact on 
market structure and seller-buyer relations in different industries. For example, Malone et al. 
(1987) advanced the idea that electronically coordinated B2B markets will tend to increase 
market transparency and reduce the role of intermediaries while Brynjolfsson and Smith (2003) 
showed empirically that electronically coordinated B2C markets reduce transaction costs and 




reduces monitoring cost in supply chains and likely leads to more outsourcing and to the 
development of strategic partnerships with key suppliers.  Porter (2001) theorized that the 
adoption of the Internet as a coordination platform would tend to shift bargaining power from 
sellers to buyers.  Clemons (2008) posited that social commerce technologies like online 
communities, recommendation systems, and consumer ratings and reviews increase consumer’s 
knowledge about products, availability and prices. This leads to consumers demanding steeper 
compromise discounts, decreasing consumers’ willingness to pay for products that are useful to 
them but do not perfectly meet their individual preference and taste.  Finally, Zwass (2010) 
concluded that web 2.0 based coordination platforms foster collective effort by users in order to 
co-create consumer value.  
The literature on IT-enabled coordination looks specifically at the impact of an IT 
innovation on a specific market and finds that new IT-enabled coordination tools and 
mechanisms lead to significant changes in market structure (e.g., level of vertical integration, 
role of intermediaries, bargaining relationships) and market performance measures (e.g., 
economic efficiency, price and profit levels, transaction costs, transparency levels). Juxtaposing 
theoretical arguments among economists about the bargaining power of buyer groups and group 
coordination create the environment by which the effect of technology enabled coordination 
mechanisms can be closely examined with respect to outcomes and the behaviors of individuals 
and groups.  
 Based on analytical results using economic modeling, researchers have suggested that 
improving the coordination and cooperation process among group buyers should result in higher 
welfare for both buyers and sellers (Chen, et al. 2009; Jing and Xie, 2011; Liang, et al. 2012). 




Kaufmann and Wang, 2001; Lai, et al. 2006), but none of the currently available studies has 
specifically investigated how communication capacity among buyers affects group-buying 
performance. Adding communication capacity can affect both individual users’ attitudes and 
group performance. The presence of reciprocal communication can positively influence 
cognitive and affective involvement of individual users (Jiang, et al. 2010), and increasing media 
synchronicity among group members can improve group coordination (Dennis, et al. 2008; 
Huang and Benyoucef, 2013).  
Platform sponsors, who control the platform design, need to be aware that increased 
social facilitation (and communication support for the buyers) may present risk of buyer 
collusion to sellers, and leading to defection by the buyers or sellers.  Through the inclusion of a 
competitive arousal model for decision-making under time pressure on a group-buying platform 
based on Ku et al (2005) one of the studies proposed in this paper, extends the research to a 
group level, instead of individual as designed by Ku et al. (2005), and the introduction of the 
social facilitation mechanism whereby the communication channel possibly enhances 
competitive arousal, testing for effects of social facilitation on task completion and time to 
completion.  
Finally, this paper borrows from sociology and psychology through the inclusion of the 
concept of interdependence. In the prescribed model, the buyers must work together to extract 
surplus from the market. In the absence of any cooperation, buyers receive no reward.  
Interdependency theory helps formulate an understanding of coordination by defining the ways 
in which social relationships shape both intrapersonal and interpersonal processes (Rusbult and 
Van Lange, 2002). It helps categorize the situations people encounter when coordinating activity 




Interdependence theory provides dimensions by which to classify situations in which 
dependence occurs. The first four dimensions are a) level of dependence, b) mutuality of 
dependence, c) basis of dependence, and d) covariation of interests (Rusbult and van Lange, 
2002).  In collective buying, buyers have a high level of dependence since buyers bid for a 
product at the same price and all buyers within the group are required to commit to the purchase. 
Second, there is a high degree of mutuality due to the fact that no one buyer is more important or 
can exert more influence than others, assuming all buyers are working to maximize their value 
and have no other motives.  
Similarly, the covariation of interests states that each buyer has corresponding outcomes 
and benefits.  Finally, the basis for dependence relies on joint control and “tend to yield 
adaptation in the form of coordination” (Rusbult and van Lange, 2002). Joint control produces 
ability-driven traits and behaviors, and unlike partner control, governed by rules of convention 
instead of morality-based decisions (Rusbult and van Lange, 2002). Thus, in group-buying 
situations, it could be concluded that buyers will work together from a profit-maximizing, utility 
standpoint, as opposed to non-utility based motives. 
Collective buying, like other auction mechanisms, has a very strong temporal dimension, 
i.e. buyers must wait until enough members in a group have agreed to make a bid. 
Interdependence theory predicts that buyers may be influenced, not only by immediate outcomes, 
but predictions of future outcomes or consequences of outcomes as a consequence of interaction 
(Rusbult and van Lange, 2002). Time constraints impact market participant’s behavior in group 
buying, especially at the start and ending period of auction (Kaufman and Wang, 2001), thus the 
temporal dimension of the interdependency structure must be factored. By analyzing the 




the buyers are truly interdependent. Manipulating both the design of the IT artifact, i.e. inclusion 
of communication and coordination mechanisms, as well as manipulating the buyers reward 
mechanism, through the inclusion of financial incentive payments will provide greater insight 
into the outcomes and behaviors of these interdependent buyers.  
1.1 Research Questions 
 By using the theories from experimental economics, IT coordination, and psychology this 
research seeks to fill the preceding literature gap by conducting three empirical studies exploring 
outcomes and behavioral effects of the IT enabled coordination on markets. 
 Specifically, this research addresses some general research questions, as follows: 
 
Study 1: What is the impact of group size (larger vs. smaller) and communication capacity level 
(high vs. low) on group performance in terms of economic welfare (buyer surplus) and group 
coordination (task completion time)? 
Study 2: Under competitive conditions and time pressures, how are buyer’s outcomes affected 
and how do their behaviors change in terms of bidding and or use of communication. 
Study 3: This study examines the structure of the group using social network analysis to 
determine if certain characteristics of the network, i.e. centrality measures of actors in a network, 
group formation, coordination or performance.  
Study 4: This study investigates the message data collected from the use of the social 
communication tool to examine the communication patterns of the buyers in order to better 
understand how the communication effects their bidding activity with respect to group formation 




 This paper first proposes to utilize an IT artifact in which an experiment is created to 
examine the outcomes and behaviors of by manipulating group size and communication on 
group performance in terms of buyer surplus and group coordination  using a social buying, or 
group buying, market mechanism. The second paper examines the role of competition in a 
similar market through changes in the design of the IT artifact.  
 Next, the third study will alter the design of the interface under guidelines set forth for 
economic experiments and more recently advocated for information systems studies. This study 
will also have dynamic group formation. Finally, the last study investigates the message data 
collected from the use of the social communication tool to examine the communication patterns 
of the buyers. The richness of the data will allow for an exploration of how users' group-buying 
behavior and performance is affected by the adoption of new technology capabilities. 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
Economic Theories Countervailing Power  
Auction Theory 
Induced Value Theory 
IT Theories Media Synchronicity Theory 
Task Technology Fit 
Group Formation 
Psychology Theories Interdependence Theory 
Social Presence, Trust, Drive Theory  
Primary Focus Buyers surplus & Group Formation 
Key Elements Buyers, social commerce, communication mechanism, competition, 
technology-design, network structure, message patterns 
Design 2x2 2x2x2 1x2  
SNA 
Exploratory 







Level of Analysis Group / Ind Group /Ind Group /Ind Ind 




1.2 Key Concepts 
Market (Social Commerce)  
The quest to understand the potential effect of technological advances on economic 
surplus and prices requires an exploration into the theoretical foundation of the interaction 
between prices and information. For example, Hayek (1945) proposed that price signals in the 
market contain all the information necessary for efficiency in the markets. Hayek’s point 
regarding the uniquely critical role of prices has been a focal point for researchers for over 60 
years, and at the time ran contrary to two prevailing theories of competitive equilibrium (Smith 
1982). First, the price-taking hypothesis stated that competitive equilibrium can only be achieved 
in the presence of a large number of buyers and sellers, making individual deviations immaterial, 
thus making prices constant (Cournot, 1838).  Second, competitive equilibrium can only be 
achieved under the complete information assumption, the presence of perfect knowledge of the 
conditions affecting supply and demand (Samuleson, 1966). Hayek’s premise provides a 
different and unique perspective that researchers would vigorously test, whereby these 
conditions, need not, necessarily, be present.  
 The notion of solving power issues in economic markets also represents a principle 
concept in economic research. Solutions to economic power had traditionally been explained by 
two major theories, the power of competition and regulation by the state (Rha and Widdows, 
2002). However, Galbraith, in 1952, had presented an alternative solution, to problems of 
economic power, called the Countervailing Power theory. He provided an explanation of the 
evolution of countervailing power by stating that existence of strong buyers would evolve as a 
response to aggregation of power by sellers, and furthermore that this evolution would “occur 




Economic experiments allow researchers to test theories and models (Smith, 1982). A 
notable number of market experiments validated the Hayek Hypothesis showing that neither 
price taking nor complete information was necessary to achieve competitive equilibrium in an 
oral double auction (Smith, 1982).  Providing more empirical evidence on these and other 
economic theories is the cornerstone of economic experiments, as opposed to theoretical 
economic modeling.   
Similarly, a number of economic experiments on countervailing power have been 
conducted including the supply and demand curves for products were common knowledge 
(Davis and Wilson, 2008), and a small number of buyers influencing monopolist pricing (Engle-
Warnick and Wilson, 2005).  Noting the difficulty of exerting countervailing power, Galbraith 
(1952) stated that any countervailing power exercised by consumers would manifest itself 
through intermediaries such as wholesalers and retailers, who could more easily organize.  
This research focuses on developing an economic experiment using a social buying or 
group buying market. Social commerce generally refers to e-commerce activities that are 
supported with social technology platforms or social media tools (Huang and Benyoucef, 2013; 
Liang et al., 2012; Liang and Turban 2012). Online group-buying represents a social commerce 
example that uses a market mechanism in which customers with similar interests but diverse 
demands participate in generating collective orders with volume price discounts (Kaufman et al., 
2010). Thus, the simulation created will attempt to simulate a buyer-initiated intra-auction 
group-buying model. It should be noted that the experiments conducted in the following chapters 
represent a narrow branch of IT enabled markets, i.e. group buying, or social commerce, are a 
much broader set of diverse markets. By conducting the study in this manner, it allows us to 




designs the findings might have some implications that will help enhance the understanding of 
the interaction between buyers and sellers. 
IT Enabled Market 
This study focuses primarily on the effect IT-enabled coordination within a market. The 
economic theories presented by Hayek and Galbraith, represent the core of how the design of the 
IT artifact was perceived. First, as Hayek (1947) notes, price he believed was all that was needed 
to communicate changes in the market. Second, Galbraith (1952) believed that power of sellers 
could be countermanded through coordination, but that this coordination could never occur at a 
consumer level, since the coordination required was too complex.  
By exploring various ways to create an IT-enabled market, theories can be tested using 
economic experiments. Current technology, e.g. internet and more specifically, group buying 
platforms, create IT artifacts whereby communication is more easily facilitated and information 
transfer can be richer (Daft and Lengel, 1986), allowing us the opportunity the effect on prices 
and buyer behaviors based on the economic theories above.  
This research views social communication on group-buying platforms as a new form of 
an IT-enabled coordination mechanism. The literature on IT-enabled coordination looks 
specifically at the impact of an IT innovation on a specific market and finds that new IT-enabled 
coordination tools and mechanisms lead to significant changes in market structure (e.g., level of 
vertical integration, role of intermediaries, bargaining relationships) and market performance 
measures (e.g., economic efficiency, price and profit levels, transaction costs, transparency 
levels). Prior literature provides insight by categorizing different types of tasks in which IT 




Media Synchronicity Theory (MST) posits that communication is enhanced when a 
technology provides the proper level of synchronicity, defined as the “state in which individuals 
are working together at the same time with a common focus” (Dennis, et al. 2008). Media higher 
in synchronicity leads to better performance in convergence processes, whereby the objective of 
reaching a common understanding and confirmed agreement is based on the individual’s 
interpretation of the information, not the raw information itself (Dennis, et al. 2008; Lind and 
Zmud 1991). In addition, media higher in synchronicity also seems to support the type of 
coordination and collaboration predicted by interdependence theory, since the dimensional 
structure matches higher joint control, high level of mutual dependence and higher levels of 
covariation of interests which are governed by rules of convention, instead of morality-based 
decisions (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2006), e.g. maximizing-utility.  
  By examining the impact of incorporating a novel IT-enabled coordination mechanism in 
the design of an electronic group-buying platform, from the buyers’ perspective, the results 
should supplement the existing theoretical foundations of IT enabled markets and provide 
additional insight into the outcomes and behaviors. 
Group Size 
With respect to the selected market and examining the effect of communication on 
exercising power, the review of the literature, focuses specifically on understanding the effect on 
buyer performance in the presence of seller market power, operationalized via a collective 
buying mechanism, in which the size of the groups and communication methods are 
manipulated.  
Previous experiments compared prices in a two-buyer and four-buyer experiment under a 




four-buyer model (Ruffle, 2000). The explanation for the lower price was that if one buyer in the 
two-buyer model withheld their demand, the two sellers would compete by lowering the price. In 
the four-buyer case, three of the four buyers were required to withhold their demand for the 
competition between sellers to take hold. Engle-Warrick and Ruffle (2006) would repeat the 
experiment under a monopolistic posted-offer setting, and reached the same conclusion but they 
posited that a monopolistic seller was more cautious in their posted offers with two buyers than 
with four buyers.  
This research explores the possibility that, first, a double auction, or variant, might reach 
a different conclusion. Since demand in this experiment is controlled at one unit per seller, 
demand withholding is removed, unlike Ruffle (2000) and Engle-Warnick and Ruffle (2006). 
According to countervailing power theory, four-buyers should be able to exercise more power 
than two buyers, therefore, this research predicts that under a double auction mechanism, i.e. 
collective buying, buyers will be able to exercise more countervailing power.  Using this prior 
research, group size is held constant for these experiments at 2 and 4, which will be referred to as 
small group and large group, respectively.  
Communication Mechanism 
 Rha and Widdows (2002) studied how consumers actually organize to exercise 
countervailing power, especially on the Internet. Forming successful coalitions of consumers 
requires better organization and simplified communication. The Internet provides the means by 
which communication and organization can occur more efficiently, breaking down demographic, 
geographic, and temporal barriers (O’Leary and Cummings, 2007).  
The communication process pertaining to the group-buying task represents an example of 




(Lind and Zmud, 1997). According to the theory of media synchronicity, a simple synchronous 
communication channel like an instant messaging tool can provide a good fit for such 
communication process needs (Dennis et al., 2008). With the appropriate communication tools, 
group buyers should collaborate more effectively in order to reach consensus and achieve 
common goals (Zigurs and Buckland, 1998). Hence, offering additional communication capacity 
to the buyers should enable them to share more information and thus coordinate better bidding 
strategies and consequently also obtain better deals compared to buyers groups without such a 
communication mechanism.  
Competition 
Research on competitive interaction has shown that time pressure is a critical driver for 
competition as it increases the need to make quick decisions and decreases the consideration of 
the consequences (Kaufman et al., 2010; Lai et al., 2006; Malone et al., 1987). Introducing 
competition allows for the study of decision-making under pressure of online consumers (using a 
particular setting; an electronic group buying platform).  
Social facilitation, in this research represented as the group of buyers in the experiment, 
can heighten the effects of competition, can increase dominant responses and can enhance 
performance on salient tasks (Hammond, 1986; Porter, 2001). Competitive emotions and 
increased dominant responses are more apparent in larger groups than smaller groups and thus 
differences are expected between the larger groups and smaller ones in the presence of 
competition (Zajonc, 1965).  
Group Formation 
 According to interdependence theory, more information is required to remove ambiguity, 




less cognition, would be required. Rha and Widdows (2002) postulated that the Internet was a 
perfect medium for group buying because of its ability to increase communication and 
coordination. When individuals are reliant on others for their outcome, more information and 
increased communication should result in more efficient group formation (Rusbult and 
VanLange, 2006).  Increasing communication capacity should enable buyers to share more 
information and thus coordinate better with the member of their buyer group in comparison to 
groups without the added communication mechanism.  
The type of task has been shown to be important for group formation, and as such, this 
research uses Media Synchronicity Theory as the framework to understand the effect of 
technology to enhance task performance within virtual teams. Convergence processes, e.g. group 
buying, are enhanced with media that is high in synchronicity, i.e. faster and simpler (Dennis et 
al., 2008) Thus, exploring the method of communication in a collective buying environment 
seems logical. Based on the literature, information is a necessity for groups to form and commit 
to a purchase. Utilizing this concept, along with interdependence theory, the addition of 
enhanced communication should enable buyers to share more information and form groups faster 
(Rusbult and VanLange, 2002).  
Research Model 
Based on the key elements of the dissertation, each study uses an experimental simulation 
designed according to the best practices for economic experiments as prescribed by Smith 
(1984). Each of the studies varies some element of the experiment in order to provide some 
replication of the experiment and thus strengthen, validate, or repudiate prior results.  Variations 





The basic research model is to examine the relationship between the manipulated 
variables of communication channel and group size on buyer surplus and time to task 
completion.  
 
Figure 1: Overall Research Model 
Each study varies the basic model slightly to examine more closely the effect of the 
manipulation. Further, following the principles of economic experiments as prescribed by Smith 
(1994), each study seeks to reinforce the results of the previous studies. The first study focuses 




represented as time to task completion by manipulating group size and the presence of a 
communication channel, as well as possible interactions.   
 In the second study, the experiment introduces competition, and examines the interaction 
effects between all of the variables, and examines the nature of the messages exchanged between 
participants. Furthermore, the study seeks to examine the overall effect of competition on 
winning, and posits that that introducing competition will not only decrease the failure rate of the 
tasks, but also further, that it will negatively effect buyer profits and increase the time for groups 
to form. Further, the study seeks to examine the interaction effects with the inclusion of 
competition.  
 The primary focus of the third study will determine the effects of redesigning the 
interface slightly to add a richer interface with slightly more information provided to the bidder. 
This study also introduces induced value on the subject for performance payouts. The study will 
attempt to replicate the results of the previous studies, however social network analysis 
techniques will be employed in an effort to determine how centrality, betweenness, and degree of 
a network impacts average buyer profit, and time to task completion, i.e. successful bid.  
Finally, the last study aggregates the message data from all the previous studies. The 
richness of the information provided in the messages between buyers can provide significant 
insight into how buyers use the communication channel to increase profits or speed up their time 
to task completion, i.e. successful bid. The study will look at how emotions affect performance, 
and further, the study will examine how users who only communicate pricing information fare in 





2. Social Buying: The Effects of Group Size and Communication on Buyer 
Performance – Study 1 
2.1 Introduction 
Social buying, or group-buying, presents a new form of social commerce (Liang and 
Turban, 2012) and has attracted a fair amount of attention from business worldwide since early 
2000s. Industry examples of group-buying businesses include early ventures like Mercata, which 
ceased operation by 2004, as well as more recent ones like Living Social and Groupon. The 
nascent market of online group-buying is still evolving and companies continue to innovate both 
new group-buying technology platforms and business models. Exploring new revenue streams 
and experimenting with new technology features are the two principle drivers for business 
change in this dynamic industry.  This study focused on the latter of the two and examines, 
mainly from the buyers’ perspective, the potential value of introducing a new social technology 
feature on a group-buying platform.  
From a theoretical perspective, the study is motivated by research on IT-enabled 
coordination, viewing social communication on group-buying platforms as a new form of an IT-
enabled coordination mechanism. The literature on IT-enabled coordination looks specifically at 
the impact of an IT innovation on a specific market and finds that new IT-enabled coordination 
tools and mechanisms lead to significant changes in market structure (e.g., level of vertical 
integration, role of intermediaries, bargaining relationships) and market performance measures 
(e.g., economic efficiency, price and profit levels, transaction costs, transparency levels). The 
aim of the present study is to add to this body of research by examining the impact of 
incorporating a novel IT-enabled coordination mechanism in the design of an electronic group-




There have been theoretical arguments among economists about the bargaining power of 
buyer groups and group coordination since at least the 1920s, predominantly saying that larger 
buyer groups should be able to obtain better prices from sellers but that coordination costs 
among buyers may offset price advantages when buyers do not already have established 
relationships (Galbraith, 1952). Yet, in the absence of modern information and communication 
technology, Galbraith at the time also argued that advantages of group-buying in practice were 
essentially limited to corporate buyers in large-scale procurement and supply chains, while they 
were largely unavailable to consumers because of the difficulty for them to coordinate buying 
decisions, especially given their differences in product attribute preferences and product 
valuations. Recent advances in digital technology, however, have enabled the development of 
online platforms that do in fact support coordination of consumers on a large scale.  
Commercial group-buying platforms support various forms of social buying. These platforms 
differ in how groups form, what kinds of deals are offered, what group size thresholds are 
required to make deals, how group buyers can communicate with each other and what social 
features are supported, and how prices are determined. Group size and communication capacity 
are hence two salient features for the design of group-buying models from both a theoretical as 
well as a practical perspective. 
 Based on analytical results using economic modeling, researchers have suggested that 
improving the coordination and cooperation process among group buyers should result in higher 
welfare for both buyers and sellers (Chen et al., 2009; Jing and Xie, 2011; Li et al., 2004). 
Empiricists are also showing interest in group-buying related issues (Kaufman et al., 2010; 
Kaufman and Wang, 2001; Lai et al., 2006), but none of the currently available studies has 




performance. Adding communication capacity can affect both individual users’ attitudes and 
group performance. The presence of reciprocal communication can positively influence 
cognitive and affective involvement of individual users (Jiang et al., 2010), and increasing media 
synchronicity among group members can improve group coordination (Dennis et al., 2008; 
DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). 
  Thus, the present research explores specifically the impact of group size (larger vs. 
smaller) and communication capacity level (high vs. low) on group performance in terms of 
economic welfare (buyer surplus) and group coordination (task completion time).  
The experiments proposed in the laboratory adapt the buyer-initiated intra-auction 
group-buying model (Chen et al., 2009). It is expected that group size will have positive effects 
on buyer profits and larger groups should extract more surpluses on average than smaller groups. 
It is also expected that there will be a negative impact of group size on group coordination in 
terms of time to task completion. In general, adding communication capacity should hinder task 
completion, and this effect should be stronger for the larger groups than the smaller ones due to 
increased complexity.  
Ultimately, this study examines the possible tradeoffs between the benefits from IT-
enabled coordination capabilities and its associated costs due to increase task complexity, which 
raises the question of how to manage consumer interactions on social buying platforms.  
2.2 Theoretical Perspective and Hypothesis Development 
Social commerce generally refers to e-commerce activities that are supported with social 
technology platforms or social media tools (Huang and Benyoucef, 2013; Liang and Turban, 




uses a market mechanism in which customers with similar interests but diverse demand regimes 
participate in generating collective orders with volume price discounts  (Kaufman et al., 2010).  
The present group-buying study looks at two important dimensions of group 
performance, economic performance and group task performance, from the buyer perspective. 
Group profits indicate monetary payoffs for the group buyers, while task performance measures 
indicate how well the buyers in a group coordinate to accomplish the group tasks of agreeing on 
a joint offer and making a deal with the seller. Examining how group size and communication 
capacity affect group performance, the study draws on two principal streams of research to 
theoretically ground the research and develop specific hypotheses. The economics literature is 
used to theorize the relationship between buyer group size and buyer surplus generated in the 
market. Second, media synchronicity theory and task complexity theory are utilized to theorize 
the effect of communication capacity and information availability on group coordination.  
Group Buyer Profit  
Countervailing power theory provides us with the theoretical basis to understand how 
group size and communication capacity can affect, the arguably most important aspect of group-
buying performance, group profit (i.e., total buyer profits, or buyer surplus).  Galbraith (1952) 
presented countervailing power theory, stating that unbalanced economic power can be “held in 
check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it” and that the existence of 
coordinated buyers would evolve as a response to aggregation of power by sellers. Researchers 
have found that buyer concentration is a source for countervailing power, which can lower seller 
margins and accrue more surplus at the buyers’ side (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Galbraith 
originally focused on the buying consortiums of his time and noted that large buying groups 




possible for consumers to exercise some form of direct countervailing power, too, but pointed 
out that it would be unrealistic to expect it to occur in practice at any significant level because of 
the difficulty for them to coordinate effectively. But nonetheless, consumers could realize some 
of these benefits indirectly, through intermediaries (Galbraith, 1952). Rha and Widdows (2002) 
extended this view to electronic commerce settings.  
Economists have confirmed this kind of benefit to consumers when large retailers 
exercise countervailing power (Lustgarten, 1975; Schumacher, 1991) and pass some of the 
achieved cost savings on to their customers. By providing quantity discounts, group-buying sites 
attempt to aggregate disparate and asynchronous buyers, with buyers benefiting from lower 
prices (and thus higher buyer profits) and sellers benefiting from increased economies of scale 
(Anand and Aron, 2003). However, retail intermediaries can be replaced with electronic group-
buying sites, for some purchases, since online consumers can interact more easily (Malone et al., 
1987). Similarly, Porter (2001) has argued that the Internet has the potential to increase the 
bargaining power of buyers. Moreover, Parameswaran and Whinston (2007) and Rezabakhsh et 
al. (2006) have suggested that the shift of bargaining power to consumers will be stronger in 
social commerce environments based on Web 2.0 architectures, such as social buying settings, 
than in standard Internet commerce environments. Recent economic experiments on 
countervailing power have shown that even a small number of buyers can influence monopolist 
pricing, concluding that group size matters.  Ruffle (2000), for example, showed that markets 
with two buyers (smaller groups) attained lower prices than those with four buyers (larger 





Hypothesis 1 (Group-Size—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Increasing the group size of buyers in 
a group-buyer model will tend to increase buyer surplus.   
 
Rha and Widdows (Rha and Widdows, 2002) studied how consumers actually organize to 
exercise countervailing power, especially on the Internet. Forming successful coalitions of 
consumers requires better organization and simplified communication. The Internet provides the 
means by which communication and organization can occur more efficiently, breaking down 
demographic, geographic, and temporal barriers (O’Leary and Cummings, 2007).  
The communication process pertaining to the group-buying task represents an example of 
a typical convergent process, which needs support for verification, negotiation, and clarification 
(Lind and Zmud, 1991). According to the theory of media synchronicity, a simple synchronous 
communication channel like an instant messaging tool can provide a good fit for such 
communication process needs (Dennis et al., 2008) With the appropriate communication tools, 
group buyers should collaborate more effectively in order to reach consensus and achieve 
common goals (Zigurs and Buckland, 1998). Hence, offering additional communication capacity 
to the buyers should enable them to share more information and thus coordinate better bidding 
strategies and consequently also obtain better deals compared to buyers groups without such a 
communication mechanism. Thus, the second hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2 (Communication-Capacity—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Introducing a 






Assuming heterogeneous consumer preferences in terms of different willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) values held by buyers introduces some conflicts of interest. For example, high-WTP 
buyers, that is, buyers who are willing and able to pay a higher price for a product, may want to 
bid to increase the chances for an offer to get accepted by the seller, while low-WTP buyers may 
not be able or willing to follow suit and drop out of a group bid. Evidently, bigger groups 
encounter more such interest conflicts than smaller groups. Group buyers can coordinate better 
bidding strategies if they can recognize those conflicts and reach consensus within the 
constraints of the low-WTP buyers in order to not jeopardize possible deals. Of course, in some 
cases, a deal that is acceptable to all may still be difficult to negotiate, or simply not be possible 
at all. Introducing a communication channel among buyers should help buyers recognize WTP 
related conflicts and move their group level price threshold towards a feasible level. The more 
potential conflicts are present among buyers, the more important the communication channel 
should be for mitigating them.  Moreover, the effect of the communication channel on increasing 
group profit should become more salient in bigger groups than in smaller groups. Hence, 
theoretically, in accordance with Baron and Kenny (1986), the communication channel, not only 
serves as a predictor for buyer profits but also as a moderator between group size and buyer 
profit by strengthening the effect of group size. Therefore, the following interaction effect 
between group size and communication level is proposed in hypothesis 3:  
 
Hypothesis 3 (Communication-Capacity & Group-Size Interactions on Buyer-Surplus 
Hypothesis): The positive effective of introducing a communication channel for buyers to 
exchange private messages on buyer surplus will become more salient in bigger groups than in 




Group Task Completion 
The second dimension of group performance considered task completion, and primarily 
how fast the members of a group can complete the task of generating their first joint offer to the 
seller. This involves decisions to join a group bid and to negotiate a jointly agreed on bidding 
price. Time to task completion is strongly connected with task complexity. Theory suggests that 
task complexity is best conceptualized from three interdependent perspectives—psychological 
experience, task-doer interactions, and objective task characteristics (Campbell, 1988). When 
task performance is regarded as a psychological experience, the doer’s motivation, the level of 
stimulation, and potential arousals during the performance of the task should be taken into 
account (Taylor, 1981).  
The task-doer interaction relationship focuses on the doer’s cognitive limitation and task 
related proficiency (Shaw, 1976; Hammond, 1986). Objective measures for complexity can be 
constructed from the number of information sources and the degree of information diversity that 
the people who are involved in performing a task are confronted with (Steinmann, 1976).  
Importantly, both group size and communication capacity can change the nature of a task and 
thus change task complexity (Campbell, 1988). Enlarging the group size can substantially 
increase the information input to the task performance process, and hence increase task 
complexity. Introducing a private communication channel will allow the buyers to acquire more 
information through exchanging messages instead of merely observing the market movement on 
the trading platform. Working on more complex tasks, groups should need more time to reach 
consensus.  
Compared with a bigger group, a smaller group deals with fewer divergent WTP values, 




WTP related bidding conflicts that need to be resolved.  On the other hand, coordination 
becomes more complex as the size of the group increases. For example, Chen et al. (Chen et al., 
2009) have shown that technology provides, in principle, effective communication in intra-
auction bidding clubs, but coordination becomes increasingly more difficult as the member base 
grows, leading to the 4th hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 4 (Group-Size—Task-Completion Hypothesis): Increasing the group size of buyers 
will tend to delay group task completion.   
 
Similarly, making a buyer communication channel available on the group-buying 
platform introduces a new information source to the buyers, in addition to the publicly posted 
bidding prices, and one which can make WTP related conflicts more transparent. On the one 
hand, the new information can help buyers coordinate more effective bidding strategies by better 
recognizing the different pricing constraints. But on the other hand, some of the shared 
information may be irrelevant to the task or even incorrect. Processing the additional information 
also presents a higher cognitive load for each buyer, and consequently may lead to longer 
processing time before completing the group task. The information exchange among the buyers 
increases their mutual interdependency, which tends to help them work out better coordinated 
outcomes (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002), but also increases task complexity and may make the 
buyers more cautious in announcing their individual offer prices (Campbell, 1988; Steinmann 





Hypothesis 5 (Communication-Capacity—Task-Completion Hypothesis): Introducing a 
communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages will tend to delay group task 
completion. 
 
Furthermore, because buyers in bigger groups face more potential conflicts, when they 
deal with more diverse WTP values than those in smaller groups, they are likely to exchange 
more information through the communication channel than those in smaller groups in order to 
manage conflicts and reach agreements. The information exchanges in larger groups, dealing 
with increased levels of potential interest conflicts, are also likely to create more emotional 
pressure than in smaller groups and stimulate arousal among buyers, thus increasing the 
cognitive challenges they face (Campbell, 1988; Taylor, 1981) and decelerating the group 
decision-making process. The relationship conflicts, pertaining to feelings, tension and friction, 
will further slowdown the task completion process, and especially in more complex tasks (De 
Dreu and Weingart, 2003). Therefore, it is proposed that there is an interaction effect between 
communication and group size with regard to task completion. 
Hypothesis 6 (Communication & Group-Size Interactions on Task-Completion Hypothesis): 
Introducing a communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages will delay the 




Using a specific variant of the buyer-initiated intra-auction group-buying model proposed 




market in the laboratory where participants are asked to coordinate group purchases of a single 
product from a monopolistic seller. Each individual buyer is given a demand of one unit with a 
pre-assigned unique willingness-to-pay value. These valuations vary across buyers, thus 
modeling heterogeneous consumer demand preferences. Buyers are pre-assigned to groups. The 
experimental environment is developed using the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and was 
implemented in a Windows client-server networked environment. Z-tree is a software package 
widely used in the economics field. Z-tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic 
Experiments was originally developed at the Economics Department at the University of Zurich.  
Participants were recruited from an undergraduate student subject pool and are 
compensated with course credit in an introductory level information systems class. The study 
uses a 2x2 factorial design in which two variables are manipulated, group size and 
communication capacity, at two levels.  First, group size was manipulated comparing smaller 
groups with larger groups, and based on prior experimental research (Ruffle, 2000), smaller 
groups are operationalized as 2-buyer groups and larger ones as 4-buyer groups. The second 
manipulation compared low versus high communication capacity among buyers.  At the high 
level, communication capacity is operationalized by the inclusion of a communication channel as 
a social technology feature on the buyer screen while no such communication channel is offered 
at the low level. The communication mechanism resembles a standard chat box that is widely 
known across many platforms.   
As depicted in the flow chart (included as Appendix A), which shows the basic logical 
sequence of the events and decisions in the experiment, buyer subjects can either place an 
opening bid (the first proposed purchasing price to be offered to the seller) or join an already 




number of buyers (minimum buyer threshold) has joined the offer at the proposed bid price.  
Hence, group bidding occurs in two stages, requiring the completion of two group tasks.  
The first task involves proposing bids, among themselves, to determine an agreed joint 
offer bid. The bargaining process with the seller begins after the first task has been completed 
and a joint offer submitted to the seller. Successfully negotiating with the seller and making the 
deal presents the second group task in our study. If the seller rejects an offer, the buyers need to 
renegotiate a new, improved bid. This process continues until the seller either accepts an offer 
and closes the deal (the group successfully completes the task) or the experimental round 
terminates when time expires, without making a deal (the group fails to successfully complete 
the task).  
Procedure  
 Each session consists of groups with 1 seller (monopolist) and either 2 or 4 buyers. Upon 
entering the lab, the participants were randomly assigned to computer terminals with a seller 
screen for the seller and a buyer screen for the buyers.  Once the participants are seated, they are 
asked to review a set of instructions that explains the electronic group-buying mechanism and the 
user interface for their specific role as either a buyer or a seller. Each session consisted of one 
extended practice period and ten experimental periods, where buyers worked to coordinate group 
offers to the seller. The data from the practice round was discarded and not used in the analysis. 
Each regular round lasted 150 seconds.  
The seller receives only finalized group bids, once a group has agreed on a joint offer. 
The seller screen shows the group bid as the number of people who joined in the bid, the offer 




shot). The seller then has the opportunity to accept the bid and thus terminate the current round, 
or not. Buyers can work on a new, improved joint offer if their bid is not accepted.  
While the seller user interfaces are simple, convenient, and very easy to use, the design of 
the buyer screen was a bit more complex (as illustrated in Appendix D). It shows them their 
assigned willingness-to-pay (WTP) value of the product they are asked to buy. With the 
beginning of each round, a buyer can initiate a bid, or wait and join an existing bid price. When 
all buyers in the group join a bid, a group offer was generated and immediately forwarded to the 
seller for review. In any case, a new bid price can be proposed at any time. Buyers observe the 
market by looking at the current bids, pending offers, and also by learning from declined offers. 
In the treatment with a private communication channel buyers are able to exchange text 
messages via an instant message type of communication box. No such communication channel is 
available to sellers, nor can sellers see any of the messages in the communication between the 
buyers.   
When a transaction occurs, i.e. a seller accepts an offer from the buyer group (completing 
group task 2), both the seller’s profit and buyer’s profit are calculated and shown to the 
participants. Individual buyer profits (buyer surplus) are computed for each buyer as transaction 
price less WTP value. Summing individual buyer profits over the members of a group yields 
group profit. No profits accrued when a round ended with no bids accepted. The subject rewards 
were not linked to task completion time. 
 In each period of the ten repeated rounds of the experiment, the buyers are given different 
WTP values, generated randomly, and rotated to buyers sequentially in each period (as detailed 
in Appendix B). First, 10 random integer numbers are generated between 25 and 100 from a 




rounds for all experimental groups in order to experimentally control for WTP effects.  In the 
first round of the experiment, the first two (or four) numbers are assigned to the two (or four) 
group buyers sequentially, and in the second round, the next two (or four) values, starting from 
the second number, are assigned to the buyers sequentially, and so on. This WTP rotation 
method ensures that every buyer gets to use all of the ten generated values over the course of the 
ten repeated rounds and, additionally, that for any given round all buyers have also different 
values.  
Measures 
The two experimental treatment variables, presence of the communication channel and 
group size, represent the two independent variables in the study. Two dependent variables, 
group-level profit, measured as average buyer profit within groups, and group performance are 
also investigated in terms of time for group task completion. More specifically, the latter is 
measured as the time a group needed to generate their first joint offer for the seller, which was 
previously defined as the first group task.  Because, the groups control this performance task, it 
is chosen as the primary task performance indicator in the study. Performance of the second 
group task is also measured, making a deal with the seller, by calculating the success rate of task 
completion over the repeated rounds of the experiment as a secondary group performance 
variable in the study.  To control for round effects, the periods are modeled as control variables. 
In addition, data is also collected on bidding and communication activities of the group buyers, 
by observing the number of bids submitted and number of messages posted per buyer and group. 
Group profits were normalized by group size as well as for average WTP within experimental 




2.3 Data Analysis 
Descriptive Analysis  
 The experiment was carried out with a total of 45 groups. Each group had one seller and 
either two or four buyers. Data from each group was collected in one session over 10 rounds of 
bidding. The design represents a typical 2 x 2 experiment with repeated measures. The 
descriptive analysis of the experimental data is summarized in table 2. Of the 450 rounds of 
potential deal making by the 45 groups, 296 final bids from 44 groups were successful and 
accepted by sellers, and 154 rounds were unsuccessful and failed to produce a winning bid. Due 
to inconsistent show-up rates of the recruited subjects at the lab for the scheduled experiments, 
some planned sessions had to be cancelled, resulting in an unbalanced experimental design.  
 Without Communication With Communication 
 # Bids 
(Groups) 
Buyer Profit Completion Time # of Bids 
(Groups) 
Buyer Profit Completion Time 




(11) 40.7 10.3 16.7 12.5 
94 




(12) 41.8 7.8 24.5 21.0 
42 
(8) 40.2 7.1 41.5 34.9 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Successful Rounds of Bidding 
 One of the groups in the treatment with four buyers and without a communication 
channel exhibited total group performance failure and did not generate any successful bids. In 
the rounds that did not generate a sales transaction, groups failed for two reasons. Either the 
buyers could not agree on a common bid to form a group offer (failure to complete the first 
group task) or the submitted bids were too low and rejected by the seller (failure to complete the 
second group task). Periods with unsuccessful bids were removed from the main analysis. On 
average, buyers in the larger groups outperformed their counterparts in the smaller groups in 




consistent with our Group-Size—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis (H1), but formal testing will be 
discussed later in the following section.  
 A nonparametric Spearman’s rho correlation analysis was conducted to check the 
correlations between the major measures of the study (Table 3). The correlation between the two 
dependent variables, group profit and time for group formation, is significantly negative, which 
implies that more time spent on the preparation for the first bid does not necessarily mean higher 
profit. The correlation analysis shows that communication capacity is negatively correlated with 
buyer profit (p<0.01) and positively correlated with time for group task completion, (p<0.05). 
Group size is positively correlated with both profit (p<0.1) and the time for group task 
completion (p<0.01).  
 
 Profit Time Comm-Capacity GroupSize Period 
Time -.395**     
CommCapacity -.191** .117*    
Group Size .088† .254** -.163**   
Period .132* -.119* .039 .064  
Number of Bids 
Submitted -.198
** .069 -.111 -.187** -.057 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
†     Regression significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 






Figure 2: Buyer Profit Figure 3: Time to Task Completion 





 Number of group bids submitted, used as a proxy for degree of buyer initiative, is 
negatively correlated with profit (p<0.01). This indicates how tactically buyers act in submitting 
group bids, but also reflects how tough the seller is in terms of rejecting group bids. High 
numbers of group bids submitted shows a lot of activity but could also mean that the buyer group 
does not develop an effective bidding strategy over the course of the experiment.  
 The rank of the bidding period (1 to 10) is positively correlated with profit (p<0.05) and 
negatively with time for group task completion  (p<0.05). The correlation results indicate that 
buyers in later rounds tend to generate higher profits in less time than in earlier rounds of the 
experimental session. The trend lines of profit and time over the bidding periods are consistent 
with the correlation analysis as represented in Figures 2 and 3. These results point to the possible 
presence of learning effects, prompting us to incorporate the periods as control variables in the 
following hypothesis testing.  
 
Hypothesis Testing  
 Because rounds with unsuccessful deal-making attempts were treated as missing values, 
an unequal sample size was obtained for the 2×2 design. In order to control for the effect of 
repeated measures with unequal sample size, two sets of statistical examinations were applied.  
First, multiple linear regression analysis was used for the main test. Second, a robustness test 
followed using a mixed model analysis with maximum likelihood estimation to verify the results. 
Thus, the following regression model was developed for our analysis.  





Time =β0 + 𝛽!!!!! 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑!+ β 10GroupSize + β 11CommCapacity +β12(GroupSize×CommCapacity) + ε2  
(2) 
Notes:  
Profit: buyer surplus 
Time: time to generate the first bid 
αi, βi : regression Coefficients (i=0,1… 12) 
Periodi: experiment period (i=1, 2…9) 
GroupSize: group Size (bigger vs. smaller) 
CommCapacity: communication Capacity (with / without communication box) 
GroupSize×CommCapacity: interaction term of group size and communication capacity  
ε1, ε2: error term 
Main Test 
 Dummy variables were introduced to model group size (GroupSize) and communication 
capacity (CommCapacity). Specifically, for the treatment with the smaller group size (2-buyer 
model) GroupSize was coded as “0”, and for the larger group size, GroupSize=“1”. Likewise, the 
treatment without communication channel CommCapacity was coded as “0”, and the treatment 
with communication channel was coded as CommCapacity=“1”. Additionally,  9 dummy 
variables were generated to represent the experimental periods 1 to 9, while “period” 10 served 
as the reference measure. Two separate regression tests were conducted to analyze the main 
effects of group size and communication capacity on the two dependent variables profit, 
referring to the buyers profit, and time, referring to the first group bid generation time.  
 Combining the results of the two separate linear tests in table 4, shows buyer profit at the 
group level, expressed as average profits of the buyers within a group, across the ten repeated 




each of the four treatments, a hierarchical multiple linear regression was conducted in four 
stages, “Model 0”, “Model 1”, “Model 2”, and “Model 3”, in which the variables, Period, 
CommCapacity,  GroupSize, and the interaction effect (CommCapacity×GroupSize) were added.  
 The 9 dummy variables, Period1 through Period9 were included in the test to control for 
the effect of repeated measurement, especially learning effects. According to Model 1, buyers in 
bigger groups generated $2.4 more profit than in smaller groups (p < 0.05), contributing 1.5% 
explanatory power. After adding presence of a communication channel as an independent 
variable in the regression, the effect of group size on buyer profit was still positive, but only 
moderately significant (p < 0.1) (Model 2), thus Group-Size—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis (H1) is not 
supported. Presence of the communication channel has a significant negative effect on buyer 
profit, which interestingly, not only rejects Communication-Capacity—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis 
(H2), but also shows an effect that is actually opposite to the prediction. Based on the testing 
results in Model 3, no significant interaction effect can be identified between communication and 
group size on buyer profit. 
 
M0 M1 M2 M3 
Profit Time Profit Time Profit Time Profit Time 
Intercept 42.7** 24.6** 41.5** 21.4** 43.2** 13.2** 43.7** 15.8** 
Period1 -6.2* 11.4† -6.0* 11.8* -6.2* 13.5* -6.2* 13.6* 
Period2 -4.3† -2.1 -3.8 -1.9 -4.0 1.0 -4.0 .9 
Period3 -4.7† 4.0 -4.3† 4.4 -4.6† 6.9 -4.6† 6.8 
Period4 0.6 -4.7 1.0 -4.7 0.9 -2.5 0.9 -2.2 
Period5 -1.9 -3.7 -1.6 -2.7 -2.1 -.8 -2.1 -.8 
Period6 -5.6* -2.8 -5.5* -2.9 -5.4* -1.9 -5.4* -1.9 
Period7 -4.2† -1.8 -3.9 -2.0 -3.9 .0 -3.9† -.4 
Period8 0.0 -6.3 0.2 -6.4 0.3 -5.3 0.3 -4.8 
Period9 -2.5 -6.6 -2.1 -6.5 -2.3 -4.4 -2.2 -4.1 
GroupSize   2.4* 12.3** 1.8† 13.8** 0.8 8.2* 
CommCapacity     -3.0** 8.8** -3.9** 3.8 
CommCapacity x 
GroupSize       2.5 13.4** 




Std. Error Profit 9.352  9.296  9.191  9.187  
∆R2 Time  .052  .069  .036  .020 
Std. Error Time  22.480  21.679  21.269  21.057 
Unstandardized coefficients are displayed above. ** Regression significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
 *   Regression significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). †     Regression significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4: Multiple Linear Regression Coefficients 
   
 With respect to group task performance, in terms of task completion time, both the main 
effects and the interaction effect are significant. Based on “Model 2”, the groups with the 
communication channel spent 8.8 seconds longer than the groups without the communication 
channel to generate the first agreed bidding price (p<0.01). The larger groups, i.e. groups with 
four buyers,  spent 13.8 seconds longer than the smaller groups, groups with two buyers, to 
generate the first bid (p < 0.01). Thus, increasing the size of groups and introducing 
communication delays group task completion in terms of generating an initial group bid.  
  Based on “Model 3”, groups with four buyers with a communication channel spent 13.4 
seconds longer than groups in the other treatments to generate the first bid offer, i.e. the larger 
the group the stronger the effect of communication. The R-square changes indicate that 
communication channel, group size and the interaction effect contributed 6.9%, 3.6% and 2% 
explanatory power, respectively.  
Robustness Tests 
 Using linear regression, the effects of each predictor can be predicted through the 
significance level of the coefficients. But employing a mixed model analysis has been 
recommended as the better alternative in cases with missing observations in repeated measures 
than the conventional regression method (Zwass, 2010; McCulloch and Searle, 2001). To check 
the robustness of the main tests, a mixed model analysis on the two dependent variables was 




of a group, and, likewise, the period was set as the within subject effects instead of as control 
variables. The type III tests of fix effects for the two dependent variables are shown in table 5 
and table 6, which suggest that CommCapacity is a significant predictor for Profit, and 
CommCapacity, GroupSize, and the interaction CommCapacity×GroupSize is a significant 
predictor of Time. These results are highly consistent with the results of the main tests, except for 
the effect of group size on buyer profit. The robustness analysis could not identify a significant 
effect of group size on buyer profit, however, but this inconsistency could perhaps be attributed 
to the unequal sample size of testing groups. The hypothesis testing results are summarized 
below table 7. 
  
 
Source Numerator df 
Denominator 
df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 258.6 5722.1 0.000 
Group Size 1 258.6 2.1 0.149 
CommCapacity 1 258.6 4.7 0.031 
CommCapacity 
× GroupSize 1 258.6 1.0 0.328 





Table 6: Robustness Test on Time for Task Completion 
No. Hypothesis DV Result 
 Buyer Profit   
H1 
Hypothesis 1 (Group-Size—Buyer-Surplus 
Hypothesis):Increasing the group size of buyers in a group-buyer 
model will tend to increase buyer profits.   
Buyer Profit Not Supported 
H2 
Hypothesis 2 (Communication -Capacity—Buyer-Surplus 
Hypothesis): Introducing a communication channel for buyers to 
exchange private messages will tend to increase buyer surplus. 
Buyer Profit Not Supported 
H3 Hypothesis 3 (Communication-Capacity & Group-Size Buyer Profit Not 
Source Numerator df 
Denominator 
df F Sig. 
Intercept 1 212.52 461.2 0.000 
Group Size 1 212.52 37.9 0.000 
CommCapacity 1 212.52 22.9 0.000 
CommCapacity 




Interactions on Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Introducing 
communication channel in group-buying will increase buyer profit 
in big groups more greatly than in small group. 
Supported 
 Time for Group Task Completion   
H4 
Hypothesis 4 (Group-Size—Task-Completion Hypothesis): 
Increasing the group size of buyers will tend to delay group task 






Hypothesis 5 (Communication-Capacity—Task-Completion 
Hypothesis): Introducing a communication channel for buyers to 







 Hypothesis 6 (Communication & Group-Size Interactions on 
Task-Completion Hypothesis): Introducing communication 
channel in group-buying will delay the group task performance in 





Table 7: Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
Additional Analysis 
 Based on the results, the effect of adding a communication channel on buyer surplus 
occurs in the opposite direction than theoretically predicted. Because of the dynamic and highly 
interactive nature of the group-buying process, it is difficult to discern the reasons for the 
negative effect of the communication channel. Therefore, a post-hoc analysis was conducted to 
explore some possible explanations for this unexpected but interesting finding.  
 In tables 8 and 9, which summarize the descriptive statistics on bidding and 
communication activities —number of bids submitted and number of messages posted, the 
analysis shows that bigger groups submitted more bids and exchanged more messages than 
smaller groups, implying that bigger groups have to process more information within the same 
time window in the process of reaching consensus on a joint offer than smaller groups. Thus a 
logistic regression for GroupSize and CommCapacity on success rate was conducted, using (early 
vs. late) rounds as a control variable, and found that bigger groups were less successful in 
making deals, i.e. getting a bid accepted by the seller, than smaller groups (p < 0.01). The larger 
group / smaller group odds ratio of 2.625 shows that a larger group is much more likely to fail in 




showed a lower success rate than the groups without communication channels (table 8), this 
difference was statistically not significant. However, all groups were generally more successful 
in making deals in later rounds than in earlier ones (p < 0.01), confirming learning effects in 
terms of deal-making success rates similar to those found for profit levels.  
  The number of bids submitted per group depends not just on group coordination but also 
on mutual interdependencies between buyer and seller bidding tactics, e.g. forceful seller 
negotiation or buyer efficiency in response to rejection. The average number of bids submitted 
per buyer almost doubles in failed rounds compared to successful rounds (table 8). In the rounds 
that ended successfully with accepted bids, groups with a communication channel submitted 
fewer bids than the groups without the communication channel, which implies that with 
increased communication, buyers tend to submit their bids more tactically, than buyers without a 
communication channel. This leads to the notion that the availability of a communication 
channel helped groups with coordination, resulting in more efficient bidding and fewer 
exploratory bids. However, increased profits were not observed as expected from improved 
group coordination patterns.  
  Without Communication With Communication 
  Success 
Rate 
Failed Rounds Successful Rounds Success 
Rate 
Failed Rounds Successful Rounds 
  n # of bids n # of Bids n. # of bids n # of bids 
Small 
Groups 77.3% 25 12.4 85 5.6 72.3% 36 6 94 2.6 
Large 
Groups 57.7% 55 14.4 75 6.1 52.5% 38 11.1 42 5.9 
Table 8: Bids per Group 
 Failed Rounds Successful Rounds 
Small Group 1.3 (2.7) 0.9 (1.8) 
Big Group 2.9 (11.6) 1.8 (7.2) 




 In terms of messages exchanged, buyers posted more messages in rounds that ended 
unsuccessfully, i.e. rounds with failed last bids and no deal. Given the time constraints for a 
round, if buyers were not able to use the communication channel effectively, for example, buyers 
spent time posting irrelevant or redundant information, information overload could occur. The 
literature in task complexity and decision-making suggests that for performing more complex 
decision tasks, decision-makers tend to simplify the process by limiting information search to 
accelerate their evaluation (Parameswaran and Whinston, 2007). Ineffective communication 
burdens the decision making process for the buyers, which results in information overload and 
failed bidding outcomes. This applies especially to the larger groups which not only generate 
more messages per group member, but also necessitates the need to read and process messages 
from a larger number of group members. In other words, the amount of information shared 
grows with group size.  
 The analysis of buyer activity suggests that introducing a communication channel can 
help group buyers coordinate better bidding tactics, but also that if buyers use the 
communication channel inappropriately information overload might occur. Given the ambiguity 
between improved bidding tactics but unchanged buyer profits, increasing communication 
capacity will not by itself improve buyer profit in a group-buying auction setting. This outcome 
is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis that publicly posted price signals (bids) contain 
all the information needed to discover efficient transaction prices in transparent markets 
(Granados, et al. 2006; Smith, 2003).  
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
 This research is consistent with the principles of design science —designing an IT artifact 




and then evaluating it (using economic performance measures). Combining design science 
(Hevner, et al. 2004) with experimental economics (Smith, 1989), as demonstrated with this 
particular study, offers a useful approach to systematically design and evaluate new electronic 
market mechanisms and technology features that is applicable for a large range of research 
problems. Using market experiments in the laboratory presents a powerful method to evaluate 
new market designs before deploying them in the real economy. This approach is particularly 
appropriate in electronic commerce research that studies the economic value from incorporating 
IT-enabled features and mechanisms in electronic market designs or deploying them on 
electronic business platforms. 
Implications  
 The findings have implications for both research and business practice. First, addressing 
the gap in the original countervailing power theory (Galbraith, 1952) the findings suggest that 
countervailing power theory not only applies to commercial buyers in business-to-business 
commerce but also extends to consumer buyers who coordinate on electronic grouping 
platforms. Second, the findings make a contribution to the literature on IT-enabled coordination 
by showing that introducing a consumer-to-consumer communication tool can create an effective 
coordination mechanism with significant consumer value that can change the social commerce 
relations between sellers and buyers.  
 For business practice, the study suggests that group-buying site operators need to be 
concerned about both the level and the kind of communication tools they want to offer to their 
buyer customers and they need to be mindful that larger buyer groups may need different kinds 




Possible Future Research Directions  
 This paper investigated the role of communication technology in group-buying from a 
decision-making theoretical perspective, emphasizing task-technology fit and advocating a 
positivist research approach (Jarvenpaa , 1989).  In order to more accurately capture the 
dynamics among buyer groups, such as leadership, conflict management or atmosphere, an 
interpretive research method such as qualitative interviews or protocol analysis should be applied 
in future research to better understand the decision making process from the buyer’s point of 
view (DeSanctis, and Poole, 1994). In addition, the interdependent role of task complexity, 
conflicts, and group diversity (Jehn, et al. 1999) should be investigated more deeply in order to 
develop more efficient market mechanism and provide more personalized technology platform 
designs.  
 Another research possibility is to drop the design assumption of fixed, pre-assigned 
groups and let buyers decide if and when to join a group, thereby introducing some level of 
competition between buyers. More specific seller analysis should be done as well and might 
include a seller design with more complex seller cost structure with explicit reservation prices. 
Further research concerning the evaluation of other possibly more sophisticated social 
technology tools that could be used in online group-buying.  
 Finally, this study is limited to a group-buying model with an adaptive price threshold, 
but it suggested that different types of price thresholds, including fixed and adaptive ones, are 
examined in future research.  
Limitations 
 This study has a number of limitations. While the experimental design was tested in early 




limitations became only apparent after data collection had been under way or completed.  The 
following seven appear to be the most critical ones.  
1. The number of rounds in which groups failed to successfully form and transact 
was higher than expected, possibly related to restrictive time restrictions (two and 
a half minutes per round).  
2. The bidding mechanism implemented (incremental bid changes only) may have 
complicated price negotiation among buyers in cases where the valuation spreads 
were high. 
3. Buyers were pre-assigned to groups and did not have a choice to form alternative 
groups if the existing one did not match their preference structure well.  
4. Participants were compensated with course credit, which may not have been 
sufficient to fully induce economic behavior in every case.  
5. The experiment only implemented one specific type of (buyer-initiated) group-
buying model, which limits generalization beyond this particular model.  
6. It is unclear how robust our results are with respect to changes in the pre-assigned 
buyer preferences (i.e., the set of WTP values).  
7. Since there were no associated time costs in the experiment, buyers were not 
given extrinsic rewards for quicker deal completion times.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
 The study finds partial support for Galbraith’s original skepticism regarding the potential 
for countervailing power from consumers (Galbraith, 1952). While adding a communication 




better prices. In other words, the communication channel provided groups the necessary capacity 
to accomplish the coordination task of group formation but was insufficient to successfully 
accomplish the more complex task of price negotiation.  As a possible explanation of this finding 
it is suggested that a simple messaging box may be sufficient to support the former, but not the 
latter task, and that more advanced communication tools, such as social media tools with better 
information filtering features, may be necessary to provide consumers with a communication 
channel for more effective negotiation and coordination. 
 Simple message exchange appeared too unstructured and distracting to efficiently aid 
price finding in our experiments, within the given time restrictions placed on participants. 
Smaller groups were the most effective with using communication technology, but groups 
became bogged down with information overload as group size increased and more messages 
were posted and needed processing.  Larger groups with the communication channel actually 
performed worse and were ineffective in using communication technology to better support 
coordination; their performance slowed and only obtained marginally better prices. The 
complexity from larger groups offset any advantages that adding communication capacity could 
enable.   
 This interesting tradeoff between the benefits from IT-enabled coordination capabilities 
and its associated costs due to increase task complexity raises the question of how to best 






3. Examining the Effects of Competition on IT Enabled Market Coordination 
– Study 2 
3.1 Introduction 
This research presents an evaluation of a specific electronic market design based on the 
principles of design science —designing an IT artifact (e.g., an IT-enabled market mechanism 
for electronic group-buying platforms), implementing it, and then evaluating it (using economic 
performance measures). Combining design science (Hevner et al. , 2004) with experimental 
economics (Smith, 1989), offers a useful approach to systematically design and evaluate new 
electronic market mechanisms and technology features that is applicable for a large range of 
research problems. Using market experiments in the laboratory presents a powerful method to 
evaluate new market designs before deploying them in the real economy. As an example, the this 
study will explore the impact of competition and social facilitation under time pressure on group 
buying performance in terms of buyer profits and task completion and time to completion. 
Experiments conducted in the laboratory using a variation of the buyer-initiated intra-auction 
group-buying model (Chen et al., 2009). The basic experimental environment was the same as 
the one used in the first study. 
Social buying platforms support social facilitation and social presence with features that 
help buyers form groups and coordinate group tasks (negotiating a joint group offer with an 
agreed upon price and submitting it to the seller). Group buying differs from individual buying in 
standard business-to-consumer electronic commerce in two important ways. First, buyers 




obtain price discounts from the seller. Second, group-buying sites could offer features that 
facilitate social interactions among buyers. Using an electronic group buying setting is 
interesting for two theoretical reasons. First, buyers act collectively, interacting and coordinating 
with others in order to create a joint offer, called a bid, to a seller. This raises bid 
interdependency in both private and common value auctions. Second, social buying platforms 
offer a variety of technical artifacts supporting social facilitation among buyers at different 
levels, which can vary the impact on group coordination and performance. Generally, the auction 
literature has found that competition leads to overbidding and profit loss and that social 
facilitation can increase competitive motivation. 
The IT artifact poses a challenge for platform sponsors, who control the platform design. 
These designers must be aware that increased levels of social facilitation (and communication 
support for the buyers) may increase the risk of buyer collusion to sellers, causing sellers to 
defect and cease selling on the platform. 
 The creation of a group buying experiment enabling the presence of competitive arousal 
for decision-making under time pressure is based on prior research (Ku et al., 2005). However, 
this study seeks to extend Ku’s model in two distinct ways. First, this study extends the decision-
making problem from an individual to a group setting and, secondly, it introduces an online 
communication channel representing an artifact that introduces social facilitation. It is expected 
that the results should be similar to prior literature with respect to the introduction of 
competition, i.e. rivalry among buyers will have a negative effect on surplus and task time 
completion. In addition, it is expected that the effects of social facilitation on task completion 




This study should contribute to the auction and social commerce literature showing that 
buyers may develop bidding behaviors, which violate predictions of rational choice theory, and 
thus buyers may obtain some benefits from competition when buyers act as a group with 
communication capabilities. Introducing competition allows for the study of decision-making 
under pressure of online consumers (using a particular setting; an electronic group buying 
platform in this case).  
3.2 Theoretical Perspectives and Hypothesis Development 
The theoretical foundation for this study is rooted in three areas of research, psychology, 
economics and information technology. The economics literature is used to theorize the 
relationship between buyer group size and surplus generated in the market. Second, decision 
making theory in psychology and in information systems, is utilized to theorize the effects of 
competition and social facilitation on group performance in terms of buyer profits, task 
completion, and time to completion. 
Research on competitive interaction has shown that time pressure is a critical driver 
heightened state of arousal or stress, known drive theory (Zajonc, 1965), as it increases the need 
to make quick decisions and decreases the consideration of the consequences (Porter, 1980; 
Scherer and Ross, 1990). Time pressures therefore are a critical component of the hypothesis 
development, as a necessary condition for inducing this heightened state.  
Task completion 
The study of competition and task completion has its origins in social psychology when 
Triplet (1898) examined the effect on individual’s performance under competition. In 
economics, Erev et al. (1993) found that orange pickers gathered more oranges when the reward 




competition can lead to anxiety and less motivation (Deutsch 1949; Deci at al., 1981), economics 
has a long history of studying competition in markets and has generally concluded that 
competition increases efficiency in market settings for limited and contested resources  
(Hirshleifer, 1978) Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Increasing competition among buyers in a group-buyer model will tend to reduce 
the failure rate for task completion.  
  
Buyer profit 
Generally, classic rational choice theory views competitive behavior as advantageous to 
the market and individuals regarding the achievement of goals.  Behavioral research, however, 
has demonstrated a tendency for competitively motivated individuals to abandon rationally 
determined (optimal) decision rules when emotional factors, such as competition, are present, 
especially under time pressure when judgments and quick decisions are required, and when 
outcomes are there exists a high level of interdependence. These types of behaviors can severely 
impact the individual’s performance and outcome (Garcia et al., 2006; Guth et al., 1982). The 
desire to win can overpower originally stated goals based on utility maximization and thus 
individuals become more willing to exceed their desired maximum payment and ultimately take 
profit losses in order to secure the completion of the given task and win (Cox et al., 1992; 
Malhotra et al., 2008; Jones, 2011). Thus, it is posited that:  
 





As stated above, research has demonstrated that under competition, the performance of 
individuals should increase; however, the desire to win may impact individual’s rational 
performance. Additionally, researchers in social psychology have identified that the level of 
interdependence of the task may moderate the effects of competition; i.e. competition tends to be 
detrimental for performance on more interdependent tasks (Miller & Hamblin, 1963; Stanne et 
al. 1999). Recent research in social commerce suggests that social embeddedness of market 
transactions like social interactions with other online communication features can mitigate the 
effects of competitive pressure (Malhotra, 2010; Takac et al., 2011).  
 
Hypothesis 3: Increasing competition among buyers will more strongly reduce buyer profits in 
larger groups.  
Hypothesis 4: Increasing competition among buyers will less strongly reduce buyer profits in the 
presence of a communication channel.  
 
In the first study it is posited that group communication is most effective in smaller 
groups. In large groups cognitive demands on information processing can offset the benefits of 
having access to more information. Larger groups are required to process the information and 
make decisions thereby increasing their time to form groups, and thereby reducing their 
effectiveness. Hence the following is proposed.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Providing access to a communication channel where buyers can exchange private 





Time to task completion 
Researchers have also suggested that under competitive arousal individuals will shift 
from focusing on original goals (e.g. profit maximization) to others like winning an auction and 
getting what they wanted in the first place. Such a reversal of preferences can lead to a more 
aggressive pursuit of secondary goals (Bazerman et al., 1992). As Tripplet (1898) found in his 
study, the competitive stimulus can have a “powerful and lasting” effect on the performance of 
individuals.  Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 6: Increasing competition among buyers speed up the time to task completion.  
 
However, the first study posits that offering communication capabilities will tend to 
distract users as they exchange off-topic messages, which can decrease the time to completing 
the set task. Preliminary results indicate that group size negatively affects group coordination due 
to coordination problems and the complexity of group formation. Thus, the following two 
hypotheses are predicted.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Providing a communication channel among buyers will slow down the time to task 
completion.  
Hypothesis 8: Proving a communication channel among buyers of larger groups will have 
slower time to task completion than smaller groups.   
 
From the original design of Triplett (1898), which focused on the impact of competition 




20th century researchers have studied the effect of social facilitation and competition and some 
inconsistent results. The effect of social facilitation has been grouped into three categories 1) 
drive theories, 2) social comparison theories, and 3) cognitive process theories (Aiello and 
Douthitt, 2001). Zajonc (1966) prescribes that increases in arousal will enhance simple 
performance tasks and that even the “mere” presence of others is sufficient (Zajonc, 1980). 
Social facilitation may also be present when individuals are concerned about how they compare 
to others (Cotrell, 1972). From a cognitive process standpoint, distraction-conflict may also serve 
as a driver to facilitate performance of simple tasks (Aiello and Douthitt, 2011; Baron 1986). 
Baron (1986) suggests that there three conditions to trigger the effect, 1) the distraction is 
interesting, or hard to ignore, such as communication between the buyers, 2) there is a time 
pressure to complete the task, and 3) attending to the task and distraction simultaneously 
becomes increasingly difficult.  
 Larger group sizes therefore increase the amount of social facilitation, which can 
therefore heighten the effects of competitive arousal, increase dominant responses and enhance 
performance on salient tasks (Ku et al., 2005; Zajonc, 1966). Larger groups therefore can thus 
exhibit this effect at stronger levels than smaller groups (Guerin, 1986). Hence, the following is 
posited:  
 
Hypothesis 9: The presence of competition in large buyer groups will result in faster completion 
times than those of smaller groups.  
 
Increasing communication capacity should enable buyers to share more information and 




added communication mechanism (Dennis et al., 2008). Enhanced communication should prove 
to make it easier for groups to form and complete their tasks. When individuals are competitively 
motivated and rely on others for achieving the desired outcome, more information and increased 
communication should result in more efficient group formation (Lustgarten, 1975). Thus, 
relationships are expected to form more readily in the presence of additional communication. 
  
Hypothesis 10: The presence of competition will result in faster completion times in the presence 
of a communication channel.  
 
Finally, Chen et al. (2009) has shown that technology provides effective communication 
in intra-auction bidding clubs but coordination becomes more difficult as the member base 
increases. Hence, the following:  
 
Hypothesis 11: In the presence of a communication channel, larger groups will have slower time 
to task completion than smaller groups. 
 
Effects of Communication  
 Communication represents a unique perspective in the study of small groups. Lowry et al. 
(2006), specifically examined the impact of group size on communication. The study filled the 
gap in literature to measure specifically group sizes of 3 and 6, to determine the effect on the 
quality of the communication as measured by 5 constructs of quality, openness, richness, 
appropriateness, accuracy as defined by Burgoon, Bonito, et al. (2002). The study found that 




communication with respect to appropriateness, openness, and accuracy, which matched results 
from a similar study of Face-to-Face groups conducted by Burgoon, Bonito, et al. (2002).  
 Relevant research provides some possible explanations. Larger groups tend to lead to 
fewer ideas and increased conflict among the group (Valachich et al. 1995; Gallupe et al, 1992). 
Larger groups suffer from more complexity and potential distractions thereby minimizing the 
quality of their communication resulting in process losses from social loafing (Chidambaram and 
Tung, 2005), evaluation apprehension and production blocking (Aiken et al., 1994; Nunamaker 
et al., 1991)       
 The increased complexity of larger groups and increased communication therefore is 
believed to increase the conflict, thus leading to lower buyer surplus and increased task to time 
completion. Therefore the following hypotheses are developed.  
 
Hypothesis 12: Larger groups will have a larger number of communications per buyer than 
smaller groups.  
Hypothesis 13: Larger communications per buyer will negatively affect time-to-task-completion.  




An economic experiment created an electronic market in the laboratory where 
participants were asked to coordinate group purchases of a single product from a monopolistic 
seller. Each individual buyer has a private, pre-assigned value for the same single product. 




The participants were recruited from an undergraduate student subject pool and were 
compensated with course credit. However, a number of important modifications and additions 
are implemented to the basic design as described next. 
Using a 2×2×2 factorial design in which three variables at two levels are manipulated 
competition and two factors of social facilitation (group size and communication capabilities). 
Time pressure is induced by limiting the auctions to two-and-a-half minutes each held constant 
in all treatments. This time limit was determined after a number of pilot runs that have already 
been conducted. This time window was sufficient for groups to complete given tasks but short 
enough to make them feel that they needed to make decision quickly.  
In the experiment, competition (C) is induced through the creation of rival groups. In one 
treatment (C=low) only one group was present to negotiate bids with the seller. In another 
(C=high) two rival groups were created. Participants are brought in and set at stations randomly, 
and each group of stations forms a group.  Buyers can either place an opening bid (proposed 
purchasing price offered to the seller) or join an existing bid within the group. Under the 
competition mechanism, for each group, only the buyers who are willing and quick enough to 
join a common offer with an agreed bid price have the chance to become the actual buyers (if the 
bid is successful). For the groups without the competition mechanism, all buyers are in the same 
group, and therefore, there is no competition from a rival group.  
Social facilitation is represented by two variables, group size (GS) and level of 
communication (CC). First, the smaller group sizes, 2 buyers, with the presence of a larger group 
sizes, 4 buyers will be compared. Our operationalization of large and small groups is similar to 




The third manipulation compared low with high communication capacity among buyers. 
At the high level (CC=high) a communication channel was included as a feature on the buyer 
screen while no such communication channel was offered at the low level. The communication 
channel will be operationalized with a communication box, similar to an Internet chat box, where 
buyers could post and receive private messages from their fellow group members.  
Procedure 
Each session consisted of groups with 1 seller (monopolist) and either 2, 4 or 8 potential 
buyers. Upon entering the lab, the participants were randomly assigned to computer terminals 
with a seller screen for the seller and a buyer screen for the buyers.  Once the participants were 
seated, they are asked to review a set of instructions (see Appendix C) that provide information 
about the group buying mechanism and their respective roles and tasks. Each session consists of 
one practice period and 10 additional periods, where buyers worked to coordinate group offers to 
make bids to the seller. Each round lasted 150 seconds.  
The buyer and seller tasks are similar across all eight treatments with some important 
differences. In the treatments with communication channel buyers could use a chat box to 
exchange private messages, which was not available in treatments without the communication 
channel. The manipulation of the number of buyers changes the number of other buyers required 
for a group, but does not affect the interface of the buyer screens or their principle tasks. In 
treatments without competition, participants are assigned to a group before the round (static 
groups). In treatments with competition, rival groups are set up and buyers could join and switch 
groups depending on currently posted bids (dynamic groups).  
Buyers can increase their joint offer or join a different offer if their bid is not accepted. 




First, it shows the buyers the assigned valuation of the product. Each buyer has a unique, private 
product valuation that is randomly selected from a uniform distribution (25,100). To reduce the 
potential for learning effects, the product valuation values are rotated every period. Except for 
the initial bid, which can be placed by any buyer, bids could only be changed in single 
increments, i.e. represented as one-dollar increments. Once bids are placed, the other buyers can 
"join" the bid if the bid price is below their product value, thus preventing overbidding. Once the 
requisite number of buyers (2 or 4) joined, group formation occurs the bid would be submitted to 
the seller (task completion).  
In the treatments with competition, buyers can join any bid, allowing for dynamically 
forming groups, i.e., a buyer can choose a bid for 20, but then decide to join another offer at 19, 
which can be created by a different group of participants. By allowing buyers to join different 
offers, competition between individual buyers is created. The interface only tells the buyer the 
number of buyers in the group but it doesn't indicate who the other buyers are, therefore, there is 
no identification of buyers. In the treatment with a private communication channel buyers were 
able to exchange messages via an instant message type of communication box, although the 
communication channel indicates the buyer number, individual buyers can not be identified. 
The tasks and interface for the seller remained unchanged across treatments. The seller 
receives bids once a group formed and made a joint offer. The seller’s screen shows the bid 
price, the number of people who joined in the bid and the cumulative amount of the offer (see 
Appendix D for an illustrative seller screen shot). The seller then has the opportunity to accept 
the bid, which terminates the current session, or takes no action and leave the bid active, thus 
allowing time for other bids to form. Sellers only see the highest bid that meets the requisite 




When a transaction occurs, i.e. a seller accepts an offer from the buyer group, both the 
seller’s profit and buyer’s profit is calculated and shown to the participants. Buyer profits (i.e., 
buyer surplus) are computed for each buyer as transaction price less product valuation. No 
profits accrue when a round ends with no bids being accepted. The cumulative profit over all ten 
periods is used to compare how each buyer performed in the experiment. 
Experimental variables 
Independent Variables Competition (C = low or high); Communication level (CC = yes  or no) 
Group size (GS = 2 or 4) 
Dependent Variables 
Buyer profit  
Task completion (accepted bid) 
Time to completion 
Message count per buyer 
Message length per buyer 
Control Variables Time pressure (auction length = 150 secs) 
Experimental periods (P1,  P2, …, P10 = 0 or 1) 
Table 10. Experimental variables 
3.4 Data analysis 
Descriptive analysis  
 The experiment was carried out with a total of 76 groups. Groups were comprised of one 
seller and two, four or eight potential buyers. Data was collected from each group over 10 rounds 
of the collective bidding, representing a typical 2x2x2 factorial design with repeated measures.  
Out of the 760 rounds over the 76 groups, task completion occurred with 564 bids from 76 
groups, that is, those bids that were successful and accepted by a seller. The remaining 196 
rounds did not generate a sales transaction groups for two reasons. Either the buyers could not 
agree on common bid to form a group offer (group coordination failure) or the submitted bids 




successful bids and the groups that generated them broken down by experimental treatments.  A 
total of eight treatments are examined by the manipulation of three variables competition (C), 
groupsize (GS), and presence of communication channel (CC) at two levels. 
 
Competition Communication Channel 
 Group  
Size 
No Yes 
No 2 85 (11) 94 (13) 
 4 69 (12) 42 (8) 
Yes 2 69 (8) 68 (8) 
 4 70 (8) 70 (8) 
Table 11: Bids per Manipulation (Groups) 
Hypothesis testing  
Main Test 1 
The study uses a logistic regression to examine H1. Specifically, when rival groups are 
created, competition is present, and thus the failure rate was expected to decrease. When rival 
groups were created, increasing competitive arousal, the failure rate (p) for completing the task 
successfully making a group purchase in an experimental round significantly decreased from 
0.332 when competitive arousal was low to 0.134 when it was high. The odds ratio of 
competition arousal (0 /1.0) is 0.312.  
Odds ratio=[ p0/(1- p0)]/[ p1/(1- p1)] 
 
A logistic regression test shows the effect of injecting competition on the failure rate. The 
impact of providing competition arousal can significantly reduce failure rate for completing the 




freedom (p<.01)indicates that the overall effect of competition is statistically significant thus 
supporting H1.  
 β S.E Wald df Sig Odds 
Ratio 
Intercept -.701 .1019 176.3 1 .000*** .496 
Competition(C) -1.163 .1930 36.3 1 .000*** .312 
 Pseudo R-Squares 
Cox & Snell R-Square:  -0.055 (df=2) 
Nagelkerke R-Square: -0.082 (df=2) 
Table 12: Logistic Regression  
 
Main Test 2 
Dummy coding was used to convert the categorical variables competition (C), group size 
(GS) and communication (CC) into dichotomous variables. Specifically, for the treatment with 
group size of 2, GS was coded as “2”, and for larger groups, group size of 4, GS=“4”. Similarly, 
for the treatment without the availability of a communication channel CC was coded as “1”, and 
with communication channel CC=“2”; and for the treatment without competition, C was coded 
as “0”, and with competition, was coded as “1”.  An additional 9 dummy variables (P1, P2, …, 
P9) was implemented to represent the experimental periods 2 to 10, while “period” 1 serves as 
the reference measure. Two separate regression tests were conducted to analyze the proposed 
hypotheses on the two dependent variables “(buyer) profit” and on “time (for task completion)” 
respectively.  
The results of the two separate linear tests are combined in one table (Table 13), one test 
for buyer profits, aggregated across buyers and rounds, and the other test on the time for task 
completion. In order to examine the contribution of main effects and interaction effects, a 
hierarchical multiple linear regression was performed in three stages, “Model 1”, “Model 2”, and 




“communication channel”, and “group size”, were added along with three two-way interaction 
effects.  The 9 dummy variables, P2 through P10 are included in the test in order to control the 
effect of repeated measurement (round effects). The coefficients of P2 through P10 indicate the 
differences in profit or time between a specific period and the reference period 1. By statistically 
controlling for the effects of repeated measures, more valid results regarding the treatment 
effects are obtained.  
Buyer profit (H2 – H5) 
 Examining the regression models with respect to buyer profit, competition appears to be 
the only significant main effect, additionally; only the interaction between competition and 
communication appears to be significant. “Model 2” shows that the buyer profit of the groups 
under competitive conditions results in 5.94 (p<.01, ΔR2=.043) lower buyer profit than groups 
under non competitive conditions. Thus supporting H2 that competition will suppress buyer 
profits thereby benefiting the seller.  
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Profit Time Profit Time Profit Time 
Intercept 35.13** 67.07** 37.87** 52.86** 39.8*** 52.60** 
P2 8.07** -5.92 8.3** -6.36 8.32** -5.78 
P3 9.33** .86 9.49** .43 9.44** .75 
P4 3.90† -.50 4.17† -1.35 4.26† -.91 
P5 4.16† -5.83 3.99† -5.04 3.83† -5.18 
P6 10.44** -16.46* 10.2** -15.89* 10.42** -15.82* 
P7 12.94** -15.20† 12.6** -14.22† 12.79 -13.58† 
P8 3.64 -13.43 3.4 -13.34† 3.41 -13.56† 




P10 1.21 -6.82 1.3 -7.84 1.49 -7.90 
C   -5.94** 16.54** -10.39** 13.92* 
CC   -.12 5.84† -3.20* 1.89 
GS   .68 7.24* -.66 14.76* 
C*CC     6.70** 14.83* 
C*GS     2.88 -9.55 
CC*GS     -.77 -6.85 
F 8.626** 1.214 9.702** 3.565** 8.713** 3.350** 
Adj R2 .108 .003 .155 .052 .169 .059 
∆R2-Profit .108  .043  .014  
∆R2-Time  .003  .049  .007 
Table 13: Multiple Linear Regression 
Unstandardized coefficients are displayed above. 
Model 1 to Model 3: Control Variables, Main Effects, and Interaction Effects 
**. significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
†. significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Examining “Model 3” demonstrates the positive effect of the interaction term of 
competition and communication (p<.01, ΔR2=.014),. The interaction effect of competition and 
communication channel on group profit is represented in Figure 4. While introducing 
competition reduced the buyer’s profit, the introduction of a communication channel between 
buyers under competitive conditions appears to mitigate the profit supporting H4. No support for 
the main effect of group size, or interaction effects, was found in the models, therefore H3 and 





Figure 4: Interaction Plot – Effect of Communication and Competition on Buyer Profit 
Time to Task Completion (H6 – H11) 
 With respect to time for task completion, two main effects were significant at the p<.05 
level,  and one main effect was significant at p<.1 level. However, the results for H6 were 
opposite of what were expected. In the presence of competition, it was expected that the time to 
task completion would be faster; however, the results showed that time to completion actually 
slowed. According to the results in Model 2, introducing competition actually increased the time 
for task completion, completing a group purchase, by 16 seconds (p <.01). In addition, Providing 
a communication channel to buyers increases the time for task completion by almost 6 seconds 
(p<.1), while increasing the group size increases the time by about 7 seconds(p<.05). 
Collectively, the main effects contribute 4.9% of predictive power.  
The interaction effect of competition and communication (Figure 4) are positively 
significant at the 0.05 level. The model showed that the time to task completion increased under 
competition was mitigated by the presence of a communication channel by 14.8 seconds, as 
opposed to the 16 seconds without the presence of communication (β=14.83, p<.05).  This could 




interaction effects were found to be significant. ”Model 3”, with these interaction effects has 
5.9% of explanatory power. Thus, the results support H10, but no support for H9 or H11 were 
found.  
These results indicate that competition, under these conditions, appear to increase the 
time for task completion and that offering communication channels enhances this effect (Figure 
5). Additionally, a three way interaction between competition, groupsize and communication 
channel was conducted and was found to be statistically significant; however due to the 
complexity of three-way interactions, no additional insight is provided here, however it is 
recommended that future studies potentially examine this effect.  
 
Figure 5: Interaction Plot - Effect of Communication and Competition on Time to Completion 
Effects of Communication (H12 – H14) 
 It was expected as per the literature that larger groups would have an increased number 
of messages per buyer, since there would be more buyers to coordinate. In addition, it was 
anticipated that these increased communications per buyer would increase coordination time, 




there were no statistically significant effects, either main or interaction (table 14). Thus H12, 
H13 and H14 are not supported.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Avg Msg Len Avg Msgs / Buyer Avg Msg Len Avg Msgs / Buyer Avg Msg Len Avg Msgs / Buyer 
Intercept 18.047** 1.66 18.31** 1.52** 19.14 1.48** 
P2 -1.48* -.41 -1.49 .42 -1.69 .43 
P3 -2.21 .47 -2.20 .50 -2.20 .50 
P4 -1.62 .15 -1.56 .19 -1.80 .20 
P5 -.75 -.04 -.83 -.04 -.77 -.04 
P6 -2.18 .51 -2.28 .56 -2.15 .56 
P7 -2.27 .42 -2.39 .45 -2.38 .45 
P8 -3.03 .07 -3.05 .12 -3.04 .12 
P9 -4.40 .50 -4.58 .51 -4.90 .53 
P10 -1.05 .83 -1.19 .85 -1.06 .84 
C   -.88 -.00 -2.77 .08 
GS   .43 .24 -1.38 .33 
C*GS     3.80 -.18 
F .219 .339 .202 .330 .28 .307 
Adj R2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Table 14: Multiple Linear Regression (Messages) 
Unstandardized coefficients are displayed above. 
Model 1 to Model 3: Control Variables, Main Effects, and Interaction Effects 
**. significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
†. significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
In the absence of finding any statistically significant results with respect to the message 
counts and average length per message, further examination of the messages uncovered a few 
interesting results. Messages ranged in length from 1 to 90 characters in length, with an average 
message length of 15.73 characters (σ=14.12). Then a plot was created to identify the message 




categorical value (P1…P10), a number was created based on period and the time within the 
period to reflect a point within the entire simulation. This was done by taking the number of 
seconds remaining in the period and dividing by 150 to determine what part of the period the 
message was created and then adding the period number to determine at what point in the 
simulation was the message created.  For example a message created in the 15th second of the 4th 
period would be denoted as 4.10, and a message created at the 100th second of the fifth period 
would be denoted as 5.66. The scatterplot shown in Figure 6 was created with a regression line, 
which showed the effect of competition. Table 15 contains the linear model   
 
Message Length μ σ 
Overall 15.73 14.12 
Without Competition 15.19 13.95 
With Competition 16.58 14.34 
 
 β S.E t-value Sig 
Intercept 15.50 .78 19.98 .000** 
Time -.06 .12 -.49 .623 
Competition 1.39 .72 1.929 .053† 
 F= 1.979  p=.139 
R2=.001 
 
Table 15: Effect of competition on message length over entire simulation  
Unstandardized coefficients are displayed above. 
**. significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
†. significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
 
 The regression lines drawn for the competitive factors demonstrates that competition may 
increase the amount of communication that occurs between bidders and in conjunction with the 
previous results, the increased communication, represented by longer message lengths, could be 
a factor leading to the increased time to task completion and reduced buyer profit under 




that these longer messages are creating noise and not adding value to the task being performed. 
These results offer interesting avenues for future research. 
 
Figure 6: Message Length Scatterplot With Regression Lines of Competitive Factor 
 
Source Denominator d.f. F Sig. 
Intercept 551 623.1 .000 
C 551 37.833 .000 
CC 551 3.99 .046 
GS 551 .177 .674 
C * CC 551 10.916 .001 
C * GS 551 2.042 .154 
GS*CC 551 .133 .716 
Table 16: Type III Tests of Fixed Effects on Buyer Profit 
 
Source Denominator d.f. F Sig. 
Intercept 551 115.326 .000 
C 551 5.376 .021 
CC 551 .0530 .818 
GS 551 5.661 .017 




C * GS 551 1.410 .236 
GS*CC 551 .959 .328 
Table 17: Type II tests of Fixed Effects on Time to Completion 
Summary of Hypothesis Tests 
 
 Task Completion  
H1 Increasing competition among buyers in a group-buyer model will tend to reduce the failure rate for task completion.  sup 
 Buyer Profit – Main Effect  
H2 Increasing competition among buyers will tend to reduce buyer profits. sup 
 Buyer Profit – Interaction Effects  
H3 Increasing competition among buyers will more strongly reduce buyer profits in larger groups. n.s. 
H4 Increasing competition among buyers will less strongly reduce buyer profits in the presence of a communication channel. sup 
H5 Providing access to a communication channel where buyers can exchange private messages will increase profits in smaller groups. n.s 
 Time to Task Completion –  Main Effects  
H6 Increasing competition among buyers speed up the time to task completion.   Reverse found to be significant with support at p<.01 n.s. 
H7 Providing a communication channel among buyers will slow down the time to task completion.  n.s  
H8 Proving a communication channel among buyers of larger groups will have slower time to task completion than smaller groups sup 
 Time to Task Completion –  Interaction Effects  
H9 The presence of competition in large buyer groups will result in faster completion times than those of smaller groups.   n.s. 
H10 The presence of competition in larger buyer groups will result in faster completion times than those of smaller groups in the presence of a communication channel. sup. 
H11 In the presence of a communication channel, larger groups will have slower time to task completion than smaller groups..   n.s. 
 Effects of Communication  
H12 Larger groups will have a larger number of communications per buyer than smaller groups. n.s. 
H13 Larger communications per buyer will negatively affect time-to-task-completion. n.s. 
H14 Larger communications per buyer will negatively affect buyer surplus n.s. 





 To check the robustness of the main tests, a mixed model analysis was conducted on the 
two dependent variables, respectively. In the mixed model, group was set as the test subject 
instead of bids, and the period was identified as the within subject effects instead of control 
variables. In order to handle the unequal sample size issue, maximum likelihood estimation was 
used. The test results for the two dependent variables, shown in table 16 and table 17, are 
consistent with the results of the main test. 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The study contributes a novel approach combining design science and experimental 
economics for the purpose of designing and evaluating electronic market mechanism and 
platform designs. The study applies the approach to an example case from electronic commerce, 
using a bidding mechanism in an electronic group buying setting as a specific example. The 
study also offers an elaboration on Ku et al.‘s (2005) competitive arousal model for decision-
making (Galbraith, 1952) that introduces two novel features, the setting of a group-decision 
making problem and the addition of communication level as an antecedent. The research adds to 
the understanding of competitive behavior by considering the mitigating effects of offering 
communication capabilities on decision outcomes. Finally, this study contributes to the emerging 
social commerce literature by offering a novel, competition to help explain bidding outcomes in 
electronic group buying.  
The results provided demonstrate that competition plays a role in enhancing buyer profit 
and increases the chances of winning a bid, as predicted by the literature. However, while 
competition should enhance the performance of the participants, the results here show the 




perspective may be enhanced, however, because success in this case is dependent on groups, the 
group formation , i.e. time to task completion, may lag. Additionally, the specific nature of 
creating a group this context may be more complex than can be overcome by competitive forces. 
Ultimately, more research in this area should be conducted, especially around the different types 
of competition and more importantly a design that can specifically determine the difference 
between single individual competition and competition around group formation.  
The interaction effects, specifically, the role of communication on mitigation of task time 
complexity is very interesting. An in depth analysis of how the communication mechanism was 
used is warranted, and should be the subject of another study. It is not enough to just know that 
the communication channel exists, it could be important to understand what messages they 
communicate and what information is delivered to other buyers. As noted when an analysis of 
the message length was performed, the message length dropped in the latter periods, which could 
be indicative that the communication was becoming more “streamlined”, but this only occurred 
in the non-competitive manipulation. 
The study suffers from a few important limitations. First, the level of time pressure was 
held constant across all treatments. Manipulating time pressure could yield additional insights on 
the effects of competition. Second, the bids were only allowed to change in 1$ increments, which 
could complicate negotiation among buyers and reduces the external validity somewhat. 
Additionally, participants were compensated with course credit, which may not have been 
sufficient to induce economic behavior in every case, and since the experiment only 
implemented one specific type of (buyer-initiated) group-buying model, generalization is limited 




 Finally, the study has also some key practical implications for designers of group buying 
platforms and operators of group buying sites. Providing a communication mechanism between 
buyers as many social buying sites do may not impact buyer or seller profit, and therefore could 
increase the complexity for buyers. Group size consideration must be determined carefully, 
depending on the levels of competition and communication support as larger groups appear to be 





4. Examining Bidder Network Structure of IT Enabled Markets– Study 3 
4.1 Introduction 
Consumer behavior and economically based research of online activities is fairly 
abundant. Information systems research into electronic commerce over the past ten years has 
examined how consumers behave online (Bellman, et al. 1999), how theories such as TAM and 
flow theory are applied to online behavior (Koufaris, 2002), and how trust is perceived in online 
firms (Battacherjee, 2002). Unfortunately, there has been very limited research conducted on the 
nature of group buying and related activities, such as group buying. Group buying has become 
prevalent with the emergence of sites such as Mercata and Groupon.  
Economic models have sought to answer the question regarding unbalanced economic 
power, to which group buying mechanism may be a response. Based on classical economic 
literature, unbalanced economic power had two primary solutions, the power of competition and 
regulation by the state (Rha and Widdows, 2002). However, in 1952, Galbraith presented an 
alternative solution to problems of economic power, called the countervailing power theory, 
which states that unbalanced economic power can be “held in check by the countervailing power 
of those who are subject to it” (Galbraith, 1952). The theory explains the evolution of 
countervailing power as a condition in which the existence of strong buyers would evolve as a 
response to aggregation of power by sellers, and furthermore that this evolution would “occur 
not in lockstep but as a response to the other” (Galbraith, 1952). It was posited by Galbraith that 
consumers could not exercise countervailing power because of the significant coordination costs 
and communication costs. If consumers could exercise countervailing power, it would manifest 





This paper will focus on the group structure and characteristics in a competitive situation, 
while simultaneously attempting to replicate findings from the previous two studies. Studying 
the structure of the networks provides a strong method of analysis enabling the researcher to 
understand the characteristics of ties between actors (Otte and Roussau, 2002). The previous 
studies focused on the group performance and individual performance, with respect to buyer 
profit and time to completion. This study seeks to add to the current findings by exploring the 
nature of the ties formed by groups in an economic experiment and explores the effect of 
manipulating the presence of communication channel on the network structure. Furthermore, by 
developing the structural characteristics, the study aims to determine if these structures impact 
buyer performance.  
Replication is a critical component of experimental economics. Smith (1994) notes that 
replication and control are the two primary means by which attempts are made to reduce the 
error in our common knowledge of the economic processes. Recently the journal Research in 
Experimental Economics dedicated an entire journal toward replicated studies (Volume 18) 
citing in its’ call for papers, "that there appears to be a perception in the profession that 
replication is often marginalized in favor of new statistically significant results." In following the 
guidelines set for by Smith (1994), Experimental economists should perform replications and do 
so, that results can be compared with replications of previous studies. Furthermore, these 
replications are seldom, pure replications, i.e. with the exact same procedures, subject type, and 
other procedures.  More recently in October of 2014, a new journal from AIS called 
“Transactions on Replication Research” has been founded, with the first article entitled “A 
Replication Manifesto” (Dennis and Valachich, 2014). Journal AIS announced a journal 




replication for all social sciences and further encourage participation in replication research with 
rigorous methodologies.  
“We believe that replication is important to the future of information 
systems research whether it is laboratory, survey, field, qualitative or 
quantitative. Yet no current information systems journal seeks to publish 
replications nor do we have a culture that encourages replication 
research” (Dennis and Valacich, 2014) 
 
Therefore, using the guidelines for experimental economics, this study will attempt to 
replicate some of the findings from the first study with slight variations to either reinforce the 
findings, or provide alternative reasons in the event of failure. From an information technology 
perspective the interface is slightly altered to provide a richer interface, and from a control 
perspective group size is standardized, but groups are allowed to form dynamically, while 
manipulating the presence of a communication mechanism. 
Thus by conducting a replication study, changing only a few parameters, the study will 
report the findings and compare them to the previous studies. Secondly, the study will report the 
structural characteristics such as degree, betweenness and closeness of the network structure 
using Social Network Analysis, and determine the effect on buyer performance of these different 
structures.  
4.2 Theoretical Perspective and Hypothesis Development  
Consumer behavior and economically based research of online activities is fairly 
abundant. Information systems research into electronic commerce over the past ten years has 




flow theory are applied to online behavior (Koufaris, 2002), and examined trust in online firms 
(Battacherjee, 2002). Other researchers have examined key economic principles are applied in 
online auctions (Vragov, et al. 2010), piracy in digital music (Batacherjee, et al., 2003), and 
online pricing behavior (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 1999). Unfortunately, there has been very 
limited research conducted on the nature of collective or group buying and related activities. The 
appeal to sellers of the collective buying model led to sites such as Mercata and Groupon, and its 
rationale of driving prices lower through large quantity buying has been fairly obvious. 
However, its lack of widespread acceptance isn’t so obvious and therefore, the potential of this 
model hasn’t been realized either by academics or practitioners.  
Countervailing Power Theory 
Classical economic theory provides a robust analysis and framework for the regulation of 
economic power. Unbalanced economic power had two primary solutions, the power of 
competition and regulation by the state (Rha and Widdows, 2002). However, in 1952, Galbraith 
presented an alternative solution to problems of economic power, called the countervailing 
power theory.  
Countervailing Power theory states that unbalanced economic power can be “held in 
check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it” (Galbraith, 1952). The theory 
explains the evolution of countervailing power as a condition in which the existence of strong 
buyers would evolve as a response to aggregation of power by sellers, and furthermore that this 
evolution would “occur not in lockstep but as a response to the other” (Galbraith, 1952).    
Shortly after its emergence, countervailing power came under immediate criticism. The 
major counterargument was that competition and not some form of ‘countervailing power’ is the 




questioned decades later (Von Ungern-Sternberg, 1996). Galbraith himself recognized some 
limitations to the theoretical application believing that it might be unreasonable for consumers to 
exercise countervailing power even though it was conceivably possible. (Galbraith, 1952; Rha 
and Widdows 2002). Galbraith (1952) posited consumers’ exercise of countervailing power 
would only manifest itself through intermediaries such as wholesalers and retailers, who had 
more capability to organize.  
Proponents of the theory have met with some successes. Since the theory was posited, 
researchers seeking to validate this phenomenon have found that the more concentrated the 
buyers were, the lower sellers price cost margins were (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Researchers 
also have conducted experiments in countervailing power whereby the supply and demand 
curves for products were common knowledge (Davis and Wilson, 2006), and a small number of 
buyers influencing monopolist pricing (Engle-Warnick and Wilson, 2006). The last reference 
focused on two buyer and four buyer groups, and found that two buyer groups attained a lower 
price than their counterparts. While the authors identified possible different reasons for this, this 
study will focus on the differences of the group composition.  
Many economists have shown that consumers benefit when retailers exercise 
countervailing power (Schumaker, 1991; Lustgraten, 1975), primarily because consumers are 
engaged through intermediaries. However, the elimination of intermediaries is more easily 
facilitated in electronic markets since participants can interact more freely (Malone, et al. 1987). 
Disintermediation represents a critical aspect of the electronic commerce and has been 
researched extensively over the past decade. Disintermediation occurs primarily due to the 




inferred that consumers, who can deal directly with sellers, have more incentive and the therefore 
the facility, through electronic means, to exercise countervailing power.  
Rha and Widdows (2002) provided a synopsis of how consumers could exercise 
countervailing power on the Internet. In researching instances of group buying, they found that 
consumers in the early 1990’s organized to drive down prices of heating fuel in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania through the formation of the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) for Fuel 
Buying. If consumers could achieve a critical mass, they could achieve significantly lower prices 
through the negotiation of volume discounts directly from manufacturers (Rha and Widdows, 
2002). However, it wasn’t without some problems. Critical mass was not easily attained, and the 
product, heating fuel, was a commodity, which brought into question of how broadly the concept 
of countervailing power, theoretical or practical, could be applied. It is argued in their paper that 
in order to be successful, consumers would need to be better organized and would require more 
simplified communication among buyers.  
Collective Buying  
Organization and communication among buyers are the key critical components to group 
buying. Researching the factors leading to the organization of buyers, the process by which 
pricing is determined, and the decision-making process to join an offer with other buyers is 
critical to understanding how buyers can exercise countervailing power.  Traditional group 
buying sites (e.g. Mercata) offered reduced prices to buyers at various levels of volume, if 
enough buyers joined the offer at those levels. Since much of the research into group buying 
occurred in the early 2000’s comparing sites like Mercata, the research is limited to these types 
of transaction where the sellers offer the price and controlled the buying levels (Kaufman and 




This research focuses on the process by which buyers initiate the purchase decision, 
meaning the offering of the price and the volume levels, through direct demand. In the former 
case, the act of sellers providing different pricing levels gives the seller more power and as the 
seller works to entice consumers to join in the purchase. It is argued that countervailing power 
may not be at work here, primarily because there is no real organization of buyers, the 
organization activity is passive in nature, almost as if a byproduct of the purchase process.  
In order to be classified as countervailing power, via Galbraith definition, buyers must 
organize and present offers, which can then be negotiated between the seller and the group. In 
order to differentiate between the two, a new definition is proposed. For operational purposes 
this mechanism of buyers aggregating together and collaborating to offer a price for acceptance 
by a seller is classified as, collective, or collaborative, buying.  The reason for this distinction is 
to clearly delineate the activities in a collective buying arrangement whereby the buyers must 
work together to form a group and commit to the purchase. This is fundamentally different than 
the definition of group buying which focuses only on the pooling of the purchase volume to get a 
lower price (Kaufmann and Wang, 2001). 
Collective buying research in this case must therefore include as part of its research, 
group dynamics including how individuals join or create groups, group formation, the decision 
process within the group and the effectiveness of the group. Therefore, for completeness, 
additional theoretical insight must be borrowed from virtual team literature 
Virtual Group Formation   
Collective buying represents an interesting area of research for group formation. Work 
done in this area has provided the field with critical insights into topics such as contributions to 




and leadership and performance in virtual teams (Wakefield et al., 2008). However, collective 
buying could provide more insight into virtual team formation and decision-making because of 
the relative simplicity in comparison with other virtual team research. While this simplicity could 
easily be a source of contention for classification of a virtual team, the next section will attempt 
to justify the terms use.  
O’Leary and Cummings (2007) provide a strong review of the loose definitions of virtual 
teams and focus on the terms virtual and geographically dispersed. Additionally they find that 
geographical dispersion has three critical dimensions, spatial, temporal and, configurational.  A 
virtual team is identified as a group of dispersed workers brought together by information and 
telecommunication technologies to accomplish at least one task (Powell, et al. 2004). Therefore, 
while there is no doubt about the importance of telecommunication technology in collective 
buying, there could be significant debate about whether the task itself is group related and 
subsequently robust enough to constitute a virtual team. The task in collective buying could be 
defined as the offering of a price to seller by a group of buyers who must agree on the offer. This 
agreement constitutes a critical part of the task as a ‘group’. Even though this might lead to an 
iterative process (i.e. seller rejects offers and buyers renegotiate), it is the key defining task for 
the group.  Thus the requirement could be considered met, at least on the surface, for the 
consideration of these collective buying groups as virtual teams. 
McGrath (1991) provides a framework for small groups by identifying three functions 
and four modes. From a purely economic point of view, the primary function of the collective 
buying group could be considered “production” as a means to maximize the utility of each 
participant. McGrath’s other functions are “well-being” and “member-support”, which are not 




members of the group will only seek to maximize their utility. However, additional research 
might uncover more information about these functions since collective buying has a social 
component (Rha and Widdows, 2002). 
McGrath (1991) also notes that groups will exist in one of four modes Inception, 
Problem-Solving, Conflict Resolution and Execution; however, due to the simplistic nature of 
the task in collective buying, it is believed that these groups will never be in a problem-solving 
mode as defined by McGrath.  In addition, as groups evolve over time they will start at the 
inception stage identifying potential members, and proceed to conflict resolution, where price 
agreement occurs as the main activity. Finally, the group will transcend to execution, which 
would be defined as the agreement between the members to post a collective offer to the seller.  
Interdependence 
 The essence of interdependence theory relies on the notion that group members are made 
interdependent through the establishment and achievement of goals (Johnson and Johnson, 
2005). Interdependence theory analyzes how the structure of the goals of participants in a 
situation determines how they interact and the patterns of interaction determine the situational 
outcomes (Deutsch, 1949a, Johnson and Johnson, 2005). These goal structures specify the type 
of interdependence toward individual and collective goals, and through this interaction they can 
promote or obstruct the goals of others (Johnson and Johnson, 2005).   
 Goal clarity was found to be a positive significant predictor of performance for software 
development as was individual characteristics such as effort, ability and locus of control (Rasche 
and Tossi, 1992). The latter factor, locus of control, i.e. the level of perceived control an 
individual possesses, was shown specifically to be a significant positive predictor of 




attributes, task requirements, environmental uncertainty, roles and responsibilities, skills of 
individuals, goal definition and achievement, performance rewards and feedback (Van der Vegt 
and Van de Vliert, 2001). These antecedents allow for interdependence to be structured as, task 
interdependence, which represents the structural and interactive nature of actions, and goal 
interdependence, which defines the related outcomes (Van der Vegt and Van de Vliert, 2001).  
 Even defining a structure of interdependence in this manner is limiting because much of 
the work in interdependence fails to fully integrate the situational context, nature of interaction, 
and the complex nature of participants engaged in the interdependent activity (Johnson and 
Johnson, 2005). The use of a situational structure aids in understanding the specific interpersonal 
reality that social cognitive activity is about, i.e. allowing for dimensional analysis of the social 
situations in which these interactions occur (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). This situation 
structure enables a deeper understanding of the situations or the specific problems and 
opportunities presented, and the person with whom the interaction occurs and their goals and 
motives (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002).  Furthermore, due to the dynamic nature of the 
interdependence structure, the structure must specify the present reality of the situation and 
historical perspectives of interaction (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). 
 There are a number of attributes that help classify interdependence structure for groups. 
First, members of the group’s ‘level of dependence’ may vary in the perception of the degree to 
which they rely on others. John may have a higher degree of dependence on Mary if she can 
cause "pleasure or pain" (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002) toward John, and if she has more control 
over her actions. If Mary can unilaterally dismiss John's contributions or rate the contributions of 
John, then she would exhibit a lower level of dependence on John, while John would exhibit a 




 Mutuality of dependence describes the degree to which two people are equally dependent 
on one another (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). When workers possess a high degree of mutual 
dependence, the results are the benefits achieved from a balance of power, reduction of the 
threats and coercion and less reliance on norms and contracts leading to higher stability and 
positive work satisfaction (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). Control theory states that controls are 
created to align the divergent interests of a controller and controlee, and such controls are used to 
counter opportunistic behavior by the controlee and that these controls can be formal or informal 
(Tiwana and Keil, 2010). When groups exhibit high mutuality of dependence, informal controls 
might be prevalent.  
 Basis of dependence describes how partner's outcomes affect another partner's outcome, 
i.e. dependence derived from partner's outcomes. There are two types of controls that are found 
in the basis of dependence, partner control and joint control (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002).   
Assume that Mary's outcomes are reliant on John's outcomes, as would be the case in the group 
buying scenario, i.e. both most have an accepted offer, the performance and output of the 
dependent service could be considered a partner control, because the outcome of John's service 
has a direct and considerable impact on Mary's outcomes. Whereas if Mary and John are 
working more closely, and each of their outcomes are inextricably tied together, as might be the 
case if they are jointly responsible, then their collective responsibility for a successful outcome is 
joined.  
 Covariation of interests describes the degree to which partners’ outcomes correspond 
(Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). When John's activities in developing a software service benefit 
Mary in a similar manner, then their outcomes are considered to be perfectly corresponding. A 




predispositions to help them ascertain whether a current situation is good or bad. Conversely, 
when situations with conflicting interests occur, e.g. when John's activities are perfectly 
conflicting with Mary's, the situation activates emotions such as greed and fear, and thus Mary 
might examine the situation questioning whether the situation is competitive or cooperative.  
 Finally, information sharing between members of the group can greatly impact the level 
and nature of interaction (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). Incomplete information can create an 
environment of uncertainty and misunderstanding, leading to interaction difficulties (Kelley et al. 
2002). In the presence of incomplete information, participants may be unable to effectively 
interact with others on their team. Group buying participants might be unable to determine 
outcomes for combinations of behavior. Further, incomplete information may hinder one's ability 
to determine others goals and motives.  
 In summary, interdependence theory provides a theoretical foundation for understanding 
the combination of social interaction among the group as well as the task-oriented nature. Group 
buying represents an activity that is higher along these dimensions thereby requiring higher 
levels of interdependence.   
Decision-Making 
As groups form, prospective buyers will only need to determine the price they are 
collectively willing to offer. This process requires negotiation among the buyers, absent of any 
communication with the seller. A review of the literature provides four relevant theories to study 
this process (Wilson and Wilson, 1988). The first is the garbage can model, which suggests that 
decisions are analogous to garbage cans where problems, solutions, ideas and other information 
are placed rational mode (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). Since collective buying members 




appears to be the most probable method for decision-making. Buyers will test each other’s 
willingness to purchase, entice others to join the group, or disengage from the group.  
The second theory is the political model where members compete for decision outcome 
to satisfy personal interests (Pettigrew 1973; Pfeffer 1981). This model may not be as prevalent, 
because this model infers some sort of personal gain beyond the purely maximizing utility 
function (e.g. ego), which should not exist in economics.  Furthermore, in the absence of social 
cues due to electronic communication, anonymity will increase and therefore, may lead to more 
equity and empowerment among participants (Sproull and Kiesler, 1986), thereby eliminating 
dominant buyers.   
The third model is the bounded rationality model, in which decision makers tend to be 
rational but are constrained by cognitive limitations, habits and biases (March and Simon 1958; 
Cyert and March 1963). This model will most likely be used when collective buying groups have 
more experience in creating groups and determining prices. As the level of buyer’s experience 
increases, the need for communication and probing should decrease.  
Finally, collective buying groups could exhibit a purely rational model where decision 
outcomes are chosen such that maximum benefit or utility is derived (Kepner and Tregoe 1965; 
Allison 1971). Purely rational behavior seems the most optimal; however, group dynamics may 
interfere with pure rational thinking.  
Behaviors of individuals within a collective buying group is predicted to follow a 
common path, and that this path exhibits less uncertainty over time. TIP theory (McGrath, 1991) 
identifies three generic temporal problems, of which, two are relevant to collective buying. 
Temporal ambiguity may exist in collective buying from both the product availability and the 




Temporal conflicts, the second of three generic temporal problems, could occur when individual 
group member’s time interests are different, which could effect the composition of groups. For 
example, an individual may need a product sooner than the rate of negotiations among the group 
and thereby seek to join a different group or obtain the product individually. Therefore, it will be 
important to study the group formation effects of time. In an economic experiment, it is easy to 
study the effect of temporal conditions by changing the time expectations for the auction in the 
form of time pressures.  
Impact of Media on Groups 
Rha and Widdows (2002) explained the importance of organization and communication 
are for countervailing power, and how the Internet serves to meet these demands. Technologies 
that can facilitate socialization allow people with similar interests and shared values to form 
virtual communities (Chiua, et al. 2006) share information in knowledge repositories 
(Khanlanalli et al. 2005) and facilitate development of software in large open source 
development projects (Kotlarsi, J. and Oshri, I. 2005). 
Technology clearly facilitates communication thereby enhancing the opportunity to 
organize but does it enhance the collaboration effect in collective buying, thereby affecting the 
price positively for the buyers? In order to understand how technology plays a role in various 
processes, a closer look at the theory of Task, Technology and Fit  (TTF) (Goodhue and 
Thompson, 1995) is warranted, which holds that IT is more likely to have a positive impact on 
individual performance and be used if the capabilities of the IT match the tasks that the user must 
perform. Zigurs and Buckland (1998) examined TTF in a group decision support setting and 
focused on the tasks that were performed by individuals. Since task definition would be 




aggregated task categories and dimensions for determining the best fit of technology in a group 
setting.  
Using these task dimensions, the collaborative buying scheme would be defined as a 
simple task, since the outcome and solution scheme are singular, and there is no conflicting 
interdependence. Simple tasks would therefore be mapped, according to Zigurs and Buckland 
(1998), to technology that is high in communication support, low in process structuring and low 
in information processing.  
In addition to understanding the fit of technology to the particular task, it is important to 
assess the attributes of technologies that could better facilitate simple tasks such as collective 
buying. Media Synchronicity Theory (Dennis, et al. 2008) helps identify which technologies are 
best suited for particular tasks. MST provides a framework for two types of processes, 
conveyance and convergence. Conveyance processes are the transmission of a diversity of new 
information enabling the receiver to mentally understand the situation being presented (Dennis 
et. al 2008).  Conveyance processes involve more information processing and more cognitive 
processing. In contrast, convergence processes requires less information processing and more 
information transmission. In convergence processes, the individuals have a better understanding 
of the situation and require less cognitive processing to reach a decision. Convergence requires 
less deliberation, so in situations where individuals have a common understanding, encoding and 
decoding familiar information should be faster (Minsky, 1986).  
Assessment of technologies for use in conveyance and convergence processes therefore 
provides a foundation for understanding technological attributes for this research. Media that is 




synchronicity is better for conveyance processes. Therefore, the effects of different attributes of 
media and its effects on performance in a collective buying setting is examined. 
Finally, although the primary set of tasks could be considered simple, and the set of 
technologies attributes could be aligned with convergence processes, it is anticipated that the 
process will transition from conveyance to convergence, i.e. buyers who are new to the collective 
buying will need more time to adapt to the different buying process and explore the technology 
to see how it works. Therefore, initially the actual task is not simple but rather more 
“judgmental” (Zigurs and Buckland, 1998) where the outcome and solution scheme is still 
singular, but some conflicting interdependence will occur. This would require more information 
processing, which would in turn require technology attributes more fitting for a conveyance 
process. Over time, however, the level of information processing would fall, as buyers become 
more experienced in collective buying, and therefore buyers would tend toward technologies that 
are more appropriate for convergence processes.  
Network Structures 
 Social Network Analysis itself is not a theory but a methodology for investigating social 
structures and interactions between actors (Otte and Rousseau, 2002) and is derived from the 
mathematical discipline of graph theory. The primary attributes of social networks focus on the 
power of actors in a network an include degree, betweenness and closeness (Freeman, 1979).  
Ties between actors can either be directed or undirected. Directed ties possess a direction 
between the nodes, i.e. actor a initiates a bid joined by actor b.  Undirected ties are those that 
have no direction and simply indicate a connection between two nodes. Degree centrality refers 
to how central an actor is to the network based on the number of ties they have. Thus actors with 




network than actors who have fewer nodes. Betweenness refers to a position of an actor that lies 
between other actors and therefore acts as an intermediary between other actors thereby possibly 
controlling the flow of information. Closeness refers to the distance of an actor to all others in 
the network. Measures of closeness try to identify how close an actor is to every other actor 
based on shortest path algorithms.  
 While much of the work in social network analysis focuses on the actors or primary 
actors in a network, the measures described above can be transferred to the network as a whole 
and thus are known as centralization measures, as opposed to centrality measures (Scott and 
Carrington, 2011). The social structure of small networks is an important attribute, and therefore, 
for group buying, the focus will be on the centralization of the network and the characteristics 
that describe the network as a whole. Interdependence theory posts that the covariance of 
interests and the dependent nature of the actors should have some form of balance, and increased 
communication should promote the balance (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002).   
Replication in Experimental Economics  
 Replication in experimental economics is vital toward understanding the how theories 
work. Smith (1994) notes that replication and control are the two primary means by which 
attempts are made to reduce the error in our common knowledge of the economic processes. A 
review of the literature found a number of replication studies being performed such as those in 
coordination and competition (George and Zhange, 2013), effect of messages on payoff in 
competition (Deck et al., 2013), combinatorial auctions experiments (Scheffel et al. 2012), 
conditional cooperation  (Herrmann and Thoni, 2008), and monetary incentive effects 




Recently, the journal Research in Experimental Economics dedicated an entire journal 
toward replicated studies (Volume 18) citing in the call for papers, "that there appears to be a 
perception in the profession that replication is often marginalized in favor of new statistically 
significant results."   In following the guidelines set for by Smith (1994), Experimental 
economists should perform replications and so that results can be compared with replications of 
previous studies. Furthermore, these replications are seldom, pure replications, i.e. with the exact 
same procedures, subject type, and other procedures. The lack of replication overall lead 
Hamerhesh (2007) to provide guidelines for incentives to journal editors for the promotion of 
replication studies. He argues that with the current reward structure it is unreasonable to expect 
junior or even mid-level researchers to undertake replication studies. Even senior economists are 
unlikely to undertake replications without incentives beyond those that have been provided. 
Replication studies, especially in economics must be conducted since there may be differences 
across institutions, different economies, different temporal aspects, etc. (Hamerhesh, 2007).  
 While this study does not deviate significantly in terms of the attributes described by 
Hamerhesh (2007), it is important to note that from the information economics, variations might 
become apparent from the user interface. Information technology theories focus on the IT artifact 
and simply ignoring or trivializing changes to the IT artifact could be detrimental to our 
knowledge of the economic theories and how they are impacted by technology. It is widely 
known that richer technology tends to transmit more social cues and offer more means of 
communication between team members  (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Daft et al., 1987; Chidambaram 
and Jones, 1993). In addition, the IT artifact may also change the level of synchronicity, which 
can impact the type of task at hand (Dennis et al., 2008).  Using this approach, this study is 




mechanism for electronic group-buying platforms), implementing it, and then evaluating it 
(using economic performance measures). Changes to the IT-artifact as demonstrated with this 
study, offers more insight into the design of the interfaces for electronic markets, and thus 
provides more detail of how the market might be effected by changes in the IT artifact.  
 Information technology replication studies are not very common, however, there is an 
increasing call for theses studies. Dennis and Valacich (2014) have strongly advocated that 
Information Systems replication studies be conducted to enhance the discipline. They categorize 
three types of replications. The first category is exact replication, in which the study is conducted 
in the same manner in terms of method and context. The second category is methodological 
replications in which the same methods are used in a different context. Finally, conceptual 
replications are replication studies that test similar or identical research questions, but whose 
measures, treatments, analysis and or context are different.  Dennis and Valacich(2014) consider 
conceptual replications as the strongest form of replication, because they allow additional 
analysis of the concept being studied, while maintaining the experiments original intent. It allows 
for differences to ensure that wordings of items, execution of treatment or methods of analysis 
are consistent across studies.  
Therefore, using the guidelines for experimental economics, this study will attempt to 
replicate the findings from the first study with slight variations to either reinforce the findings, or 
provide alternative reasons in the event of failure. From an information technology perspective, 
the interface is slightly altered, and additionally, from a control perspective group size is static, 
but groups are allowed to form dynamically, while manipulating the presence of a 





 The previous studies sought to examine the relationship of the communication channel 
and buyer profit and time to task completion. In the first study, it was found that communication 
capacity had no effect on buyer profit, but an effect on time to task completion was present. In 
the second study, with the presence of competition, the main effect of the presence of the 
communication channel was found to not effect buyer surplus, but did delay time to task 
completion. Therefore, the first two hypotheses are replicated from the previous studies   
 
Hypothesis 1: Introducing a communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages 
will tend to increase buyer surplus. 
Hypothesis 2: Introducing a communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages 
will tend to delay group task completion. 
 
 Next, attention turns to the structure of the network. This study applies social network 
analysis techniques to small groups. Thus, a set of exploratory hypotheses is developed. As 
mentioned before, the focus of this study is on centralization attributes of the network, i.e. the 
structure of the network as a whole. From interdependence theory (Rusbult and VanLange, 
2002), tasks that are highly interdependent and that the more connections each actor has the 
better they are able to coordinate efforts. Further, if no nodes are truly central to the network then 
lower degree centralization should yield a more balanced network, which should increase the 
interdependence and increase overall performance of each buyer, and the group as a whole. The 
network should also exhibit low betweenness centralization, i.e. no single actor should act as an 




communicate to each other should ensure this. Finally, the paths from any actor to another 
should be relatively short, and there should be a relative closeness distributed among the nodes. 
Networks of this type should not have any actor that dominates or is central to the network and 
therefore closeness should be relative low, since all actors should have the same number of 
paths. The network in this study in which all actors engage evenly with other actors is described 
as a wheel or all channel network as described by Freeman (1979), shown in Table X. The 
attributes of the network should be a degree centralization of 0, betweenness centralization of 0, 
and closeness centralization of 0.  
  
Figure 7: Wheel or All Channel Network (Freeman, 1979). 
Since the presence of a communication channel will increase the ability of buyers to coordinate, 
it is expected that the communication channel should enhance the network characteristics and 
create more balance networks and thus: 
 
Exploratory Hypothesis 3: In the presence of a communication channel networks will have 
lower degree centralization.  
Exploratory Hypothesis 4: In the presence of a communication channel networks will have 




Exploratory Hypothesis 5: In the presence of a communication channel networks will have 
lower closeness centralization. 
 
 These characteristics of the network should have an impact on buyer surplus and time to 
task completion. Networks that are lower in the network attributes should be more balanced and 
achieve better buyer surplus, but more balanced networks need more time to coordinated due to 
the lack of centralization and therefore time to task completion should be slower. Thus the 
following hypotheses are derived: 
 
Buyer Surplus Hypothesis 
 
Exploratory Hypothesis 6: Networks with lower degree centralization will achieve higher buyer 
surplus than networks that are higher in degree centralization.  
Exploratory Hypothesis 7: Networks with lower betweenness centralization will  achieve higher 
buyer surplus than networks that are higher in betweenness centralization.  
Exploratory Hypothesis 8: Networks with lower closeness centralization will achieve higher 
buyer surplus than networks that are higher in closessness centralization.  
 
Time to Task Completion Hypothesis 
 
Exploratory Hypothesis 9: Networks with lower degree centralization will have slower time to 




Exploratory Hypothesis 10: Networks with lower betweenness centralization will have slower 
time to task completion than networks that are higher in betweenness centralization.  
Exploratory Hypothesis 11: Networks with lower closeness centralization will have slower time 
to task completion than networks that are higher in closessness centralization.  
4.3 Methodology 
Experimental Design 
Using a specific variant of the buyer-initiated intra-auction group-buying model proposed 
by Chen et al. (Chen et al., 2009), the economic experiment creates electronic social buying 
market in the laboratory where participants are asked to coordinate group purchases of a single 
product from a monopolistic seller. Each individual buyer is given a demand of one unit with a 
pre-assigned unique willingness-to-pay value. These valuations vary across buyers, thus 
modeling heterogeneous consumer demand preferences. Buyers are pre-assigned to groups. The 
experimental environment is developed using the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and was 
implemented in a Windows client-server networked environment. The participants will be 
recruited from a university in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States.  
In this experiment, participants will be compensated with a performance payout. 
Performance payouts are essential increase external validity, by creating a value for performance 
in the game as noted by the induced value theory (Smith, 1976). Participants are guaranteed a 
minimum level of compensation, i.e. $5, but will be allowed to earn additional compensation 
based on their performance of the game. Using previous experimental runs the value of the 
payouts will be set at .116 cents per dollar earned in the game. This represents the average 




were funded by a doctoral student grant of $1500 from Baruch College, and participants will be 
continually recruited until the grant money has been completely depleted.  
The study uses a similar interface that was used in the first study, however the interface 
has been altered. Due to the payout limitation, the only manipulation conducted in these sessions 
will be the inclusion or exclusion of the communication box. While this by itself represents a 1x2 
factorial design, there are some additional areas for analysis. First, an examination of the data 
from this interface, representing technology that is richer and of higher synchronicity will be 
compared to the data collected from the other studies. In addition, providing payouts in this study 
represents another significant difference from the first study. This presents a valid approach as 
per Smith (1994), and further supported by Dennis and Valacich (2014), that replication need not 
be a pure replication, but rather to replicate results using different environments in an effort to 
strengthen the economic theory being tested. More importantly, this study includes a post 
experiment survey that was obtained to determine the users opinions regarding feelings of trust, 
information overload, and social presence.  
Participants are brought into the experimental session and randomly assigned to stations. 
Participant’s stations were assigned to separate groups of 5. This study focuses on competition, 
by limiting group formation for bids to 3, i.e. only 3 people will be allowed to form a bid, at 
which point the bid is sent to the automated seller. Some groups will be presented with a 
communication channel, while other groups will not have a communication channel in which to 
communicate with other buyers.  
 Additionally, the seller function has been automated. In this experiment, the automated 
seller selects a random number, selected from a normal distribution (µ=50,s.d.=5) as the 




buyers form a bid, the bid is sent to the seller, which is then either accepted or rejected, if it 
matches or is above the “acceptable selling price”.  If the bid price is below the “acceptable 
selling price”, the seller waits ten seconds before rejecting the bid. This delay is to simulate a 
“decision”, since buyers were not told that the seller was automated.   
 As depicted in the flow chart (included as Appendix A), which shows the basic logical 
sequence of the events and decisions in the experiment, buyer subjects can either place an 
opening bid (the first proposed purchasing price to be offered to the seller) or join an already 
existing bid within the group. However, a group offer is not routed to the seller until the required 
number of buyers (minimum buyer threshold) has joined the offer at the proposed bid price.  
Hence, group bidding occurs in two stages, requiring the completion of two group tasks.  
The first task involves proposing bids, among themselves, to determine an agreed joint 
offer bid. The bargaining process with the seller begins after the first task has been completed 
and a joint offer submitted to the seller. Successfully negotiating with the seller and making the 
deal presents the second group task in our study. If the seller rejects an offer, the buyers need to 
renegotiate a new, improved bid. This process continues until the seller either accepts an offer 
and closes the deal (the group successfully completes the task) or the experimental round 
terminates when time expires, without making a deal (the group fails to successfully complete 
the task).  
Procedure  
Each session consisted of groups with 5 prospective buyers. Upon entering the lab, the 
participants are randomly assigned to computer terminals with a buyer screen for the buyers.  
Once the participants are seated, they are asked to review a set of instructions that explains the 




Participants are not told who is a buyer, however, the moderator of the experiment indicated to 
each participant that they would be given a set of instructions based on their role as either a 
buyer or seller, even though everyone was a buyer. The session consisted of one extended 
practice period and ten experimental periods, where buyers worked to coordinate group offers to 
the seller. The data from the practice round will be discarded and not used in analysis. Each 
regular round lasted 210 seconds, three and a half minutes, which represented an increase in time 
by one minute from the previous studies.  This change was implemented to give the buyers more 
time to coordinate activity.   
The seller receives only finalized group bids, once a group has agreed on a joint offer. If 
the bid price matches or is above the “acceptable selling price”, generated automatically, the bid 
will be accepted and the buyers will win the auction at the price of the bid. If the bid is below the 
“acceptable selling price”, the offer will be rejected after ten seconds, and buyers can work on a 
new, improved joint offer if their bid is not accepted.  
The buyer screen is more complex than the screen used in the first study (as illustrated in 
Appendix D). It shows the buyers the assigned willingness-to-pay (WTP) value of the product 
they are asked to buy. With the beginning of each round, a buyer can initiate a bid, or wait and 
join an existing bid price. When three of the five buyers in the group join a bid, a group offer was 
generated and immediately forwarded to the seller for review. In any case, a new bid price can be 
proposed at any time. Buyers observe the market by looking at the current bids, pending offers, 
and also by learning from declined offers. In the treatment with a private communication channel 
buyers are able to exchange text messages via an instant message type of communication box.  
When a transaction occurs, i.e. a seller accepts an offer from the buyer group, due to the 




buyer’s profit will calculated and shown to the participants. Buyers that win will be shown their 
profit and a signal that they have won the auction, achieved by a large green box that says “YOU 
WON”. Buyers that were not in the group will be shown a 0 profit and a large red box that says 
“YOU LOSE”. Individual buyer profits (buyer surplus) are computed for each buyer as 
transaction price less WTP value. Summing individual buyer profits over the members of a 
group yields group profit, which is not shown to the buyers, but used in the data analysis. No 
profits accrue for buyers who are not in successful bids, when a round ends. The subject rewards 
were not linked to task completion time. 
In each period of the ten repeated rounds of the experiment, the buyers are given different 
WTP values, generated randomly, and rotated to buyers sequentially in each period (as detailed 
in Appendix B). First, 10 random integer numbers are generated between 25 and 100 from a 
uniform distribution. These 10 numbers are then recorded and reused for all of the 10 repeated 
rounds for all experimental groups in order to experimentally control for WTP effects.  In the 
first round of the experiment, the first five numbers are assigned to the five group buyers 
sequentially, and in the second round, the next five values, starting from the second number, are 
assigned to the buyers sequentially, and so on. This WTP rotation method ensures that every 
buyer receives all of the ten generated values over the course of the ten repeated rounds and, 
additionally, that for any given round all buyers have also different values.  
Measures 
 In following the first two studies, one experimental treatment variable, presence of the 
communication channel, is manipulated. Two dependent variables, group-level profit, measured 
as average buyer profit within groups, and group performance are also investigated in terms of 




by seller of a bid. Additionally, network structures will be analyzed from the theoretical 
perspectives provided by Freeman (1979). The study will examine the centralization 
characteristics of the network in order to determine the effects of communication on centrality. 
Furthermore, these dependent measures will also be used as independent measures juxtaposed to 
the primary dependent variables of buyer profit and time to task completion.  
4.4 Data Analysis 
Experimental variables 
Independent Variables Communication level (CC = yes  or no) 
 
Dependent Variables 
Buyer profit  




Control Variables Time pressure (auction length = 210 seconds) 
Experimental periods (P1,  P2, …, P10 = 0 or 1) 
Table 19. Experimental variables 
Descriptive analysis  
 The experiment was carried out with a total of 21 groups. Groups were comprised of five 
potential buyers. Data was collected from each group over 10 rounds of the collective bidding, 
representing a typical 1x2 factorial design with repeated measures.  Out of the 210 rounds over 
the 21 groups, task completion occurred with 137 bids from 21 groups, that is, those bids that 
were successful and accepted by a seller. The remaining 73 rounds did not generate a sales 
transaction groups for two reasons. Either the buyers could not agree on common bid to form a 
group offer (group coordination failure) or the submitted bids were too low and rejected by the 
seller (price setting failure). Table 2 shows the number of successful bids and the groups that 






65 (10) 72 (11) 
Table 20: Bids per Manipulation (Groups) 
Hypothesis testing  
Test of Related Hypotheses From Previous Studies 
 The examination of the effect of the communication channel on performance from a 
buyer surplus perspective and a time to completion perspective continues to prove interesting. In 
the first study, the presence of the communication channel was found to be significant in 
negatively affecting buyer surplus (i.e. buyer surplus reduced with increased communication), 
and in the second study this effect was not found to be significant. With respect to time to task 
completion, the first study found a significant positive effect on task completion, i.e. the 
communication effect increased the time to completion, and the second study found a no similar 
effect (p<.1). The difference between those two studies was the presence of completion and the 
nature of group formation. .  
Dummy coding was used to convert the categorical variable communication (CC) into a 
dichotomous variable. Specifically, for the treatment without the availability of a communication 
channel CC was coded as “1”, and with communication channel CC=“2”. An additional 9 
dummy variables (P1, P2, …, P9) were implemented to represent the experimental periods 2 to 
10, while “period” 1 serves as the reference measure. Two separate regression tests were 
conducted to analyze the proposed hypotheses on the two dependent variables “(buyer) profit” 




The results of the two separate linear tests are combined in table 21, one test for buyer 
profits, aggregated across buyers and rounds, and the other test on the time for task completion. 
In order to examine the contribution of main effects, a hierarchical multiple linear regression was 
performed in three stages, “Model 1”,  and “Model 2”, in which the control variables, “period”, 
the main effects “communication channel”, were added.  The 9 dummy variables, P2 through 
P10 are included in the test in order to control the effect of repeated measurement (round 
effects). The coefficients of P2 through P10 indicate the differences in profit or time between a 
specific period and the reference period 1. By statistically controlling for the effects of repeated 
measures, more valid results regarding the treatment effects are obtained.  
Examining the regression models with respect to buyer profit, the communication 
channel is not significant. The model satisfies all the assumptions of OLS, but no main effect is 
present (p>.10), validating the findings from the second study. With respect to time for task 
completion, as with buyer profit, the main effect was found not to be significant (p>.10). Upon 
further analysis, however, it was found that the normality of residuals under OLS was violated. 
After numerous attempts to transform the dependent variable, it was found that that a log 
transformation of the dependent variable provided for the validation of assumptions of OLS. 
Furthermore, the results after this transformation show no support of a negative effect of 
communication on the log of time to completion (p=.07). 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Profit Time Profit Time Log(Time) 
Intercept 15.29** 116.33** 15.36** 159.64** 5.10** 
P2 -1.41 -41.98** -1.39 -54.37* -.068 
P3 5.04* -39.45* 5.06* -93.00** -1.40** 




P5 2.42 -70.57** 2.45 -85.39** -1.09* 
P6 1.04 -74.97** 1.08 -102.81** -1.40** 
P7 6.54** -77.97** 6.58** -102.87** -1.50** 
P8 6.03** -80.72** 6.06** -102.44** -1.38** 
P9 -3.51 -80.95** -3.48 -55.36* -.80† 
P10 6.84** -52.00** 6.87** -37.34 -.34 
CC   -.18 -13.70 -.29† 
F 4.149** 5.18 6.897** 4.29** 3.34 
Adj R2 .188 .169 .302 .195 .158 
∆R2-Profit .188  .114   
∆R2-Time  .169  .007  
Normality 
(Shapiro-Wilk) 
.37 <.01 .36 <.01 .073 
Table 21: Multiple Linear Regression 
** - p <.01, * - p<.05 † - p<.10 
 
The differences found in this study can be attributed to two unique elements presented. 
First, there is a different form of competition in the study resulting in dynamic group formation. 
Dynamic group formation represents a form of competition and competition was found to have 
an effect on performance. Second, this study uses an automated seller for bid acceptance, and 
thus the average buyer profit was lower. In this study the average buyer profit was 17.86 without 
communication and 18.08 with communication, whereas the average buyer profit in the previous 
study with communication was 20.74 without communication and 19.98 with communication. 
Social Network Analysis 
 In order to develop a picture of how individuals react in these groups, social network 
analysis techniques were performed using the connections between individuals who formed 
successful bids, i.e. bids accepted by the seller.  The resulting analysis of triads, i.e. three buyers 
that formed a bid, enables us to see whether patterns emerged for winning bids over the course of 




compared to other groups. Each time a successful bid was made and accepted by the seller, the 
connections between each member of the triad is considered an edge between the nodes (buyer), 
and a value of 1 is given. The procedure constituted tallying each one of these edges in a matrix, 
for each group.  The resulting matrix represented a weighted non-directional adjacency matrix.  
Table 22 provides an adjacency matrix for one of the runs during the session. The table shows 
the number of edges formed between each of the buyers. For example, it can be shown in the 
table that Buyer 2 formed a successful bid with Buyer 1 three times. Note that in the case where 
a single buyer would have been successful in every bid, the total number of edges, i.e. the sum of 
the row or column for the buyer, would be equal to 20, since they would have two edges, i.e. 
connected to two buyers, in each of the ten periods.   
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 - 3 1 4 4 
2 3 - 3 1 3 
3 1 3 - 0 2 
4 4 1 0 - 3 
5 4 3 2 3 - 
Table 22: Adjacency matrix for single experimental run (130823_1430_1) 
	   Once all the edges were tallied, their corresponding weights were calculated as a measure 
of all connections in the graph. Figure 8, shows the diagram for the adjacency matrix above. 
Lines in the graph are weighted for visual effect, and the number on the line represents the ratio 
of the edges between two buyers over the total number of edges.  One can easily see the triads 





Figure 8: Network diagram for single experimental run  
 Social Network Analysis focuses on the interrelationship between the actors (or nodes), 
which are represented by the edges between the nodes. In examining a network, focus is targeted 
on measures of centralization including degree, betweenness, closeness, are meant to describe 
the relative power of a node in the network. Specifically, for this study the examination of the 
structure of the network in relation to buyer profit is critical. Table 23 provides a listing of the 
















1 Yes 1.00 3 3 3 0.20 .000 .156 
2 Yes 2.40 1 1 5 0.00 .000 .000 
3 Yes 1.33 1 2 4 0.10 .028 .233 
4 Yes 2.40 1 1 5 0.00 .000 .000 




6 Yes 3.33 1 2 4 0.10 .028 .233 
7 No 1.20 2 3 3 0.25 .063 .240 
8 No 2.10 1 1 5 0.00 .000 .000 
9 No 3.00 2 2 4 0.15 .000 .175 
10 No 2.70 1 1 5 0.00 .000 .000 
11 Yes 2.70 1 1 5 0.00 .000 .000 
12 No 3.00 1 2 4 0.20 .125 .428 
13 No 2.14 1 3 3 0.30 .188 .583 
14 Yes 3.00 2 2 4 0.15 .000 .175 
15 No 2.70 1 1 5 0.00 .000 .000 
16 No 2.00 1 2 4 0.10 .028 .233 
17 No 1.50 1 2 4 0.20 .125 .428 
18 Yes 3.00 1 1 5 0.00 .000 .000 
19 No 2.70 1 1 5 0.00 .000 .000 
20 Yes 2.67 1 2 4 0.10 .028 .233 
Mean 2.38 1.25 1.75 4.25 .098 .032 .168 
Mean w/o Comm  2.19 1.36 1.91 4.09 .127 .048 .204 
Mean w/ Comm 2.45 1.30 1.70 4.3 .075 .0112 .126 
Table 23: Calculated network measures by group. 
	   For the network groups above, the average degree centralization for the graph was .098. 
When degree centralization is low, thus no single node or groups of nodes dominate the graph. 
When comparing the mean degree centralization of groups (µ =.127) without communication and 
with communication (µ=.075), there appears to be stronger node centralization when there is no 
communication, however, the Anova test of the two groups finds no statistical difference 
between the groups (F=1.09, p=.31). Therefore no relationship is found as described by EH3. 
 Analyzing the betweenness centralization of the network, the data shows that the overall 
betweenness (µ =.032) there exists a difference in the mean betweenness of the groups with 
communication (µ =.011)  and without (µ =.04), (F=3.466, p=.079), EH4 is therefore not 
conclusive.  Betweenness centralization refers to the existence of nodes that act as gatekeepers 
for the network, i.e. the act as conduits between actors in the network. While the overall 




communication channel might enable actors in the network to coordinate their activities better, 
and that the bidding activities such as price negotiations occur through the channel rather than 
through the bidding process.  
 Closeness centralization is an indicator of whether a central actor exists. The mean for 
closeness centralization (µ =.168). The anova analysis found no difference between the means 
with communication (µ =.126) and without (µ =.204). Overall no actor appears to act central to 
the network, and that the presence of a communication channel has no impact (F=1.59, p=.296). 
Therefore, no evidence of a relationship appears to exist between closeness and the 
communication channel  
 Ultimately, it is important to determine whether these network characteristics have an 
impact on performance of the group. Regression analysis was used to determine the impact of 
average buyer profit based on betweenness, closeness and degree of the network, controlling for 
the presence of the communication channel. The results presents some evidence, although not 
conclusive, of a negative relationship between centralization degree and average total profit for 
the buyers (p=.08), with the overall model not being significant (F=2.036, p=.14). Due to the 
weakness of the model with the other network related variables, an alternate model was produced 
removing these, and it clearly demonstrated a stronger relationship between average buyer profit 
and degree (F=3.401, p=.057), but still no support is provided for EH7. This negative 
relationship between degree and profit, articulates the notion that in a network where no node 
dominates the network, i.e. lower degree, average buyer profit increases, providing evidence of 
an effect of higher levels collaboration on average buyer profit. The results provided no evidence 




buyer profit. Furthermore, the presence of the communication appeared to have no effect on the 
buyer profit.  
 With respect to time to completion, i.e. successful accepted bid, the network related 
variables appear to have more significance. The model shows that each of the network 
characteristics is significant at a p<.1 level, with degree being the strongest, (p<.01), and 
betweenness being the weakest (p<.1), providing evidence of a relationship as described in EH9 
and EH10. Similar to the previous analysis with average buyer profit, the network degree has a 
strong negative relationship with time to completion.  
   
 Model 1 Alt Mod 
 Profit Time Profit 
Intercept 51.68** 57.96** 54.86** 
CC 2.13 -1.53 -.25 
Degree -126.28† -71.51** -77.83* 
Betweenness 93.40 -69.49†  
Closeness 8.11 39.89*  
F 2.036 7.32** 3.401† 
(p=.057) 
Adj R2 .179 .57 .202 
Normality 
(Shapiro-Wilk) 
.93 .80 .66 
Table 24: Multiple Regression Models, including reduced model 
** - p<.01, * - p<.05 , † - p <.10  
 Betweenness refers to the presence of nodes as gatekeepers of the network, and that 
information must pass between them on the shortest path to other nodes. The betweenness values 
for the network were relatively low, meaning that information doesn’t necessarily need to pass 
through particular nodes in order to get to other nodes. When the impact of this on time to 
completion is examined, the results show a weak negative relationship (p<.1), and is therefore 




completion will decrease, because these nodes lie between the other actors and could be 
significant in terms of their participation. Finally, the results provide evidence of an opposite 
than believed relationship on time to task completion described by EH11. Closeness 
centralization refers to the way information is passed between nodes, i.e. as the closeness 
centralization number approaches 0, every node passes information to every other node in the 
same number of steps.   
Summary of Hypothesis Tests 
 
 Communication Effects Evidence 
H1 (Communication-Capacity—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Introducing a communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages will tend to increase buyer surplus..  No 
H2 (Communication-Capacity—Task-Completion Hypothesis): Introducing a communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages will tend to delay group task completion. No 
 Network Characteristics  
EH3 In the presence of a communication channel networks will have lower degree centralization. No 
EH4 In the presence of a communication channel networks will have lower betweenness centralization. No 
EH5 In the presence of a communication channel networks will have lower closeness centralization. No 
 Network Characteristics –  Buyer Profit  
EH6 Networks with lower degree centralization will achieve higher buyer surplus than networks that are higher in degree centralization.  No  
EH7 Networks with lower betweenness centralization will achieve higher buyer surplus than networks that are higher in degree centralization. No 
EH8 Networks with lower closeness centralization will achieve higher buyer surplus than networks that are higher in degree centralization. No. 
 Network Characteristics –  Time to Task Completion  
EH9 Networks with lower degree centralization will have slower time to task completion than networks that are higher in degree centralization..   Yes 
EH10 Networks with lower betweenness centralization will have slower time to task completion than networks that are higher in degree centralization. No. 
EH11 
Networks with lower closeness centralization will have slower time to task completion than 
networks that are higher in degree centralization. Reverse found to be significant with 
support at p<.05 
No 
Table 25: Summary of Hypotheses 
 Interestingly, the results show that higher closeness results in faster time to completion, 




information passes through a central node. This could be due to the necessity of some form of 
coordination. For example, some of the bidders must be more active in bidding so that others in 
the network can follow. Once again, however, the presence of the communication channel had 
no effect on the results. 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The study combines experimental economics, information systems and social network 
analysis and for the purpose of evaluating market mechanisms. Similar to the second study, this 
study also offers a further elaboration on Ku et al.‘s (2005) competitive arousal model for 
decision making (Galbraith, 1952) introducing a group-decision making problem with 
communication level as an antecedent. However, the effect of this study replicates findings of 
prior research conducted and provides for an examination of the social structures inherent in 
group buying platforms, and IT enabled market platforms in general. This study contributes to 
the increasing social commerce literature by attempting to explain network characteristics, 
bidding outcomes and group dynamics in electronic group buying.  
The results confirm results from previous studies with respect to buyer profit and time to task 
completion. The effect of the communication channel tends to slow down groups time to 
completion and has no effect on the buyer surplus. This study provided a replication of the 
earlier studies modifying the user interface slightly and introducing a different form of 
competition, along with performance payouts for incentivized participation. 
 The network characteristics provide some significant insight into the behavior of the 
group dynamics since this study allows groups to form dynamically. Theoretically, it is given 
according to Freeman (1979) that a network such as this should be completely balanced and thus 




closeness. With interdependence theory, it should become apparent that groups that are more 
interdependent should benefit from the inclusion of a communication channel. While the results 
are mixed, i.e. not all the network level hypotheses were confirmed, the results are promising. It 
is noted that the hypotheses relating to betweenness were both confirmed, and thus the 
experiment might be more sensitive to betweenness characteristics of networks. Future research 
should closely examine these network characteristics, and design studies to study these 
relationships more closely.  
The study suffers from a few important limitations. Similar to the previous studies, the 
level of time pressure was held constant across all treatments. Manipulating time pressure could 
yield additional insights on the network effect. Second, the hypotheses developed are labeled as 
exploratory, and, as such, stronger theoretical foundations should be developed for more rigorous 
hypotheses development. Next, the study was limited in the group size of 3, with 5 buyers. As 
networks increase, different effects could be realized. Additional literature review should provide 
insight into how larger groups might interact, and the effect could be analyzed. Since large IT 
enabled markets are more realistic, the results of those finding could be more generalizable.  
 Finally, the study however has key practical implications for designers of group 
buying platforms and operators of group buying sites. Understanding the network structure 
between buyers is critical since many social buying sites rely on these structures as their core 
business, e.g. Groupon. The results of understanding how communication effects these networks 
large and small, can impact not only group buying sites, but could also be critical to emergency 
services departments that rely on networks to disseminate information and require citizens to 
actively perform a task during an emergency. While the ad-hoc belief is that increased 




indicate a potential problem with assessment, and therefore, future findings on this result could 





5. Examining Communication Patterns in IT Enabled Markets– Study 4 
5.1 Introduction 
The core element of Social buying, or group-buying, lies in the ability of groups to 
dynamically form, and communicate information to other buyers in an effort to in coordinate 
activity in the form of organizing a collective bid, and is an important an emerging aspect of 
social commerce (Liang and Turban, 2012). Industry examples of group-buying businesses 
include early ventures like Mercata, which ceased operation by 2004, as well as more recent ones 
like Living Social and Groupon. Understanding the emotions and feelings of individual buyers in 
these groups provides insight toward predicting future behaviors. This study focuses on the 
content of messages from buyers to other buyers in a group buying experiment.  
From a theoretical perspective, the study is motivated by research on IT-enabled 
coordination, viewing social communication on group-buying platforms as a new form of an IT-
enabled coordination mechanism. Consumer behavior and economically based research of online 
activities is fairly abundant, including research focusing on the attitudes toward online 
purchasing as an effect on intention to return or intention to purchase (Bellman, et al. 1999; 
Koufaris, 2002). Utilizing a group-buying model as another form of electronic commerce a 
deeper analysis of consumers communication can shed insight into activities and tasks that are 
considered interdependent.  
Economics traditionally has sought to understand unbalanced economic power. Although 
Galbraith’s theory of countervailing power (1952) seeks to explain a mechanism by which 
groups, not individual consumers, can respond to unbalanced economic power, However, the 
technological advances in recent years, through increased communication, could make 




coupled (Rha and Widdows, 2002). Countervailing power theory explains the evolution of 
countervailing power as a condition in which the existence of strong buyers would evolve as a 
response to aggregation of power by sellers, and furthermore that this evolution would “occur 
not in lockstep but as a response to the other” (Galbraith, 1952). Unfortunately at the time, it was 
not envisioned that consumers could exercise this power due to significant coordination and 
communication costs. 
The economic literature is sometimes at odds with psychological literature with respect to 
the value of emotions in understanding economic theory.  Principally, rational choice theory 
dominates the economic literature. However, in 1979, Khaneman and Tversky first explored 
from a psychological perspective the cognitive aspects of economic decision-making. 
Khaneman’s research would later win him the Nobel Prize in Economics. Rabin (1998) states 
that the economic literature focuses on “logic and precision” and that ignoring behavioral aspects 
is not beneficial, and could be the result of institutional complacency.  Others have argued 
further that simply using cognitive aspects of psychology for economic research is not enough, 
and they argue for more analysis with respect to emotions. Elster (1998) argues that more work 
in emotion theory should be performed to answer critical emotional questions such as “How can 
emotions help us explain behavior for which good explanations seem to be lacking.   
This paper analyzes the messages conducted from the three previous experimental 
sessions. In those sessions where buyers were given a channel in which they could communicate 
with other buyers, the messages were collected and analyzed to examine the type of messages 
such as price messages or emotional messages. With the availability of the rich message data, 
this study will examine the message counts, and content to ascertain if there are any patterns that 




the disclosure of private information, and negotiation, may provide insight into how the groups 
will perform both at an economic performance level as well as time to task completion task level.  
5.2 Theoretical Perspective and Hypothesis Development  
Economics of Group Buying 
Group buying sites such as Mercata and Groupon have sought to capitalize on the notion 
that consumers would actively engage in coordination activities in an attempt to obtain lower 
prices. The core element of Social buying, or group-buying, lies in the ability of groups to 
dynamically form, and communicate information to other buyers in an effort to coordinate 
activity in the form of organizing a collective bid, and is an important and emerging aspect of 
social commerce (Liang and Turban, 2012). Coordination between consumers is highly 
dependent on their ability to communicate some information to other buyers either directly 
through messages or through some technical mechanism that controls the coordination process. 
Understanding the emotions and feelings of individual buyers in these groups could provide 
insight toward predicting future behaviors. Consumer behavior and economically based research 
of online activities is fairly abundant, including research focusing on the attitudes toward online 
purchasing as an effect on intention to return or intention to purchase (Bellman, et al. 1999; 
Koufaris, 2002).   
Countervailing Power Theory 
Countervailing Power theory states that unbalanced economic power can be “held in 
check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it” (Galbraith, 1952). The theory 
explains the evolution of countervailing power as a condition in which the existence of strong 




evolution would “occur not in lockstep but as a response to the other” (Galbraith, 1952).  One 
key limitation to the theory recognized by Galbraith was the inability of consumers to exercise 
countervailing power even though it was conceivably possible (Galbraith, 1952; Rha and 
Widdows 2002). The only mechanism that was viewed as viable for consumers was through the 
introduction of intermediaries such as wholesalers and retailers, who had more organizational 
capability.  
Rha and Widdows (2002) found that consumers in the early 1990’s organized to drive 
down prices of heating fuel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania through the formation of the Public 
Interest Research Group (PIRG) for Fuel Buying. The difficulty for consumers to attain critical 
mass was a key challenge for the group, which brought into question of how broadly the concept 
of countervailing power, theoretical or practical, could be applied. In order for consumers to 
achieve success, consumers would need to be better organized and would require more 
simplified communication among buyers.  The challenge for consumers they found in 
organization and coordination was due to the complexity and variety of communication 
possibilities that needed to be transmitted and interpreted.  
Interdependence 
 The essence of interdependence theory relies on the notion that group members are made 
interdependent through the establishment and achievement of goals (Johnson and Johnson, 
2005). Interdependence theory analyzes how the structure of the goals of participants in a 
situation determines how they interact and the patterns of interaction determine the situational 
outcomes (Deutsch, 1949a, Johnson and Johnson, 2005). These goal structures specify the type 
of interdependence toward individual and collective goals, and through this interaction they can 




previous chapters, there are a number of characteristics for interdependence theory including 
level of dependence, mutuality of dependence, basis of dependence, covariation of interests and 
information sharing (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002) 
  Since this research is primarily focused on the communication messages between buyers, 
the last characteristic is of significant importance. Information sharing between members of the 
group can greatly impact the level and nature of interaction (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). 
Incomplete information can create an environment of uncertainty and misunderstanding, leading 
to interaction difficulties (Kelley et al. 2002). In the presence of incomplete information, 
participants may be unable to effectively interact with others on their team. Emotional messages 
can greatly affect others who read those messages (Kelley et al. 2002) and, incomplete 
information may hinder one's ability to determine others goals and motives (Rusbult and 
VanLange, 2002).  
 In summary, interdependence theory provides a theoretical foundation for understanding 
the combination of social interaction among the group as well as the task-oriented nature. Group 
buying represents an activity that is higher along these dimensions thereby requiring higher 
levels of interdependence.   
Emotional Messages 
 Emotions are relatively short-lived positive or negative evaluative state that has 
neurological and cognitive elements (Lawler and Thye, 1999).  From social exchange theory 
(Homans, 1958), which assumes self-interested actors will transact with other actors to 
accomplish goals they cannot achieve by themselves, researchers have examined the role of 
emotions in the social exchange process. Interdependence tasks are a central component of social 




and pervade the social exchange process”, and within the process, emotions serve as a signaling 
function for group members and bias how members in a group may perceive each other which 
could ultimately impact their interaction and decision making (Lawler and Thye, 1999).  
 The role of emotions as a signaling function is seen as communicating evaluations and 
appraisals (Parkinson, 1996). Using appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991) buyer’s appraisal of 
situations effects the buyers emotions, which in turn could be conveyed through messages which 
in turn affect other buyers impacting their interaction. Buyers in a group-buying auction are 
engaged in a joint activity which heightens the sense of collective or group membership, and this 
joint activity strengthens social solidarity through shared emotions and feelings, and thus 
positive feelings might lead to stronger affective attachment to the group. (Lawler and Thye, 
1999). 
 Some would argue that computer mediated communication (CMC) are unable to convey 
emotions. Sproull and Kiesler (1986) stated that CMC suppresses social cues and is a more 
impersonal medium. Media richness theory (Deft and Lengel, 1986) provides for the differences 
in information processing between the different types of technology based on a scale of richness, 
i.e. the ability of the technology to convey information to change understanding in a given time 
period. Derks et al. (2007) argue that “emotions are found frequently online as offline”, and 
those users of CMC, find different ways to express emotion through the technology more 
explicitly to compensate for the lack of normal face-to-face emotional cues.  
Impact of Media on Groups 
Rha and Widdows (2002) explained the importance of organization and communication 
for countervailing power. Technologies such as the Internet can facilitate socialization and allow 




Technology clearly facilitates communication thereby enhancing the opportunity to organize but 
does it enhance the collaboration effect in collective buying, thereby affecting the price 
positively for the buyers? Theory of Task, Technology and Fit  (TTF) (Goodhue and Thompson, 
1995) holds that IT is more likely to have a positive impact on individual performance if the 
capabilities of the IT match the tasks that the user must perform. Zigurs and Buckland (1998) 
examined TTF in a group decision support setting and focused on the tasks that were performed 
by individuals. Task definition is important in determining the best fit for a group decision 
support system. Zigurs and Buckland (1998) adapted the aggregated task categories and 
dimensions for determining the best fit of technology in a group setting.  
Using these task dimensions, the collaborative buying scheme would be defined as a 
simple task, since the outcome and solution scheme are singular, and there is no conflicting 
interdependence. Simple tasks would therefore be mapped, according to Zigurs and Buckland 
(1998), to technology that is high in communication support, low in process structuring and low 
in information processing.  
In addition to understanding the fit of technology to the particular task, it is important to 
assess the attributes of technologies that could better facilitate simple tasks such as collective 
buying. Media Synchronicity Theory (Dennis, et al. 2008) helps identify which technologies are 
best suited for particular tasks. MST provides a framework for two types of processes, 
conveyance and convergence. Conveyance processes are the transmission of a diversity of new 
information enabling the receiver to mentally understand the situation being presented (Dennis 
et. al 2008).  Conveyance processes involve more information processing and more cognitive 
processing. In contrast, convergence processes requires less information processing and more 




of the situation and require less cognitive processing to reach a decision. Convergence requires 
less deliberation, so in situations where individuals have a common understanding, encoding and 
decoding familiar information should be faster (Minsky 1986).  
Assessment of technologies for use in conveyance and convergence processes therefore 
provides a foundation for understanding technological attributes for this research. Media that is 
lower in synchronicity is better for convergence processes, while media that is higher in 
synchronicity is better for conveyance processes. Therefore, the effect of different attributes of 
media and its effects on performance in a collective buying setting is examined.   
Finally, although the primary set of tasks could be considered simple, and the set of 
technologies attributes could be aligned with convergence processes, it is anticipated that the 
process will transition from conveyance to convergence, i.e. buyers who are new to the collective 
buying will need more time to adapt to the different buying process and explore the technology 
to see how it works. Therefore, initially the actual task is not simple but rather more 
“judgmental” (Zigurs and Buckland, 1998) where the outcome and solution scheme is still 
singular, but some conflicting interdependence will occur. This would require more information 
processing, which would in turn require technology attributes more fitting for a conveyance 
process. Over time, however, the level of information processing would fall, as buyers become 
more experienced in collective buying, and therefore buyers would tend toward technologies that 
are more appropriate for convergence processes.  
Communication Messages in Economics 
 Since Hayek (1947) researchers have tried a number of experiments to determine if price 
contains all the information necessary for equilibrium (Smith, 1979). Galbraith (1952) believed 




consumers to communicate effectively has only been possible due to the Internet and related 
technologies (Rha and Widdows, 2002). When buyers are free to communicate, it isn’t certain 
exactly what types of messages or frequency of messages they might choose. Emotions, and thus 
emotional messages, for example, can bias decision-making (Lerner & Keltner 2001), and types 
of emotions, i.e. positive or negative, have been shown to lead to optimism or pessimism in 
decision-making (Isen, et al., 1978; Johnson & Tversky, 1983).  
 Although Galbraith (1952) posited that individual consumers could not coordinate 
effectively, the internet could act as a change agent for countervailing power..  As consumers can 
exchange information, the influence, i.e. information influence, that it exerts can effect 
behavioral buying patterns, or behavior willingness (Park & Lessing, 1977; Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980) In addition, communication between consumers can also lead to normative influences, 
such as conformity (Allen, 1965) and herd behavior (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Other messages 
from can convey additional information such as the nature of the simulation / game or market, 
which could affect performance of the subjects.  
Hypothesis Development 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the message content and its relation to buyer 
performance in terms of successful task completion and buyer profit. Thus this study partitions 
the communications into two types of messages, emotional, and price based. The literature 
review found that emotions do play a significant role in joint activities and that positive emotions 
can have a strong moderating effect on performance (Lawler and Thye, 1999). It is believed that 
emotional messages can be conveyed through communications (Derks et al. 2007). These 
messages will serve to signal intentions. If messages are positive the performance of the group 




decrease, i.e. faster successful bids and the reverse will hold true for negative emotions. Thus the 
following exploratory hypotheses are developed: 
 
Exploratory Hypothesis 1 (Positive Messages —Buyer-Surplus): Increased levels of positive 
messages will tend to increase buyer surplus. 
Exploratory Hypothesis 2 (Positive Messages —Task-Completion Hypothesis): Increased 
levels of positive messages will tend to expedite successful group task completion. 
Exploratory Hypothesis 3 (Negative Messages —Buyer-Surplus): Increased levels of 
negative messages will tend to decrease buyer surplus. 
Exploratory Hypothesis 4 (Negative Messages —Task-Completion Hypothesis): Increased 
levels of negative messages will tend to delay successful group task completion. 
 
 Hayek (1947) noted that price itself contains all the information necessary for efficient 
markets (1947). However, according to Galbraith (1952) if consumers could exchange 
information and coordinate, they could exercise countervailing power. The previous studies 
focused on the effect of enabling communication in relation to buyer performance. This notion is 
extended to actual price communications to determine if there is an effect based on increased 
“directed” or utility oriented messages, i.e. eliminating the noise from spurious messages that 
have no bearing on the actual task. Using only the price messages as an independent variable, 
this study seeks to examine if an increase in these types of messages increases buyer 
performance in the form of higher buyer profits and faster time to task completion. Therefore the 





Exploratory Hypothesis 5 (Price Messages —Buyer-Surplus): Increased levels of price 
messages will tend to increase buyer surplus. 
Exploratory Hypothesis 6 (Price Messages —Task-Completion Hypothesis): Increased levels 




An electronic market experiment was created in the laboratory where participants were 
asked to coordinate group purchases of a single product from a monopolistic seller. Each 
individual buyer has a private, pre-assigned value for the same single product. Consumer 
valuations vary across buyers and each buyer needs to buy one unit of the product. The 
participants were recruited from an undergraduate student subject pool and were compensated 
with course credit.  The experiment was conducted over a period of two years from multiple 
designs of the experiment. Each experiment had similar attributes. Each experiment had the 
presence or absence of a communication channel, and group size of 2,3, or 4, as a measure of 
social facilitation, and Time Pressure, which is induced by limiting the auctions to two-and-a-
half minutes, or three-and-a half minutes. These time limits were determined after a number of 
pilot runs that have already been conducted. This time window was sufficient for groups to 






Each session consisted of groups with 2, 4,5, or 8 prospective buyers. Upon entering the 
lab, the participants are randomly assigned to computer terminals with a buyer screen for the 
buyers.  Once the participants are seated, they are asked to review a set of instructions that 
explains the electronic group-buying mechanism and the user interface for their specific role as a 
buyer. Participants are not told who is a buyer, however, the moderator of the experiment 
indicated to each participant that they would be given a set of instructions based on their role as 
either a buyer or seller, even though everyone was a buyer. The session consisted of one 
extended practice period and ten experimental periods, where buyers worked to coordinate group 
offers to the seller. The data from the practice round will be discarded and not used in analysis. 
Each regular round lasted 150, two and a half-minutes, or 210 seconds, three and a half minutes.   
In the sessions with 2, 4, and 8 buyers, the seller is a participant; however in the sessions 
with 5 buyers, the seller is automated. Since the analysis of this study is on the messages 
generated by the buyers, the seller function is not as relevant for this study. If the bid price 
matches or exceeds the seller price, the bid will be accepted and the buyers will win the auction 
at the price of the bid. If the bid is below the “acceptable selling price”, the offer will be rejected, 
and buyers can work on a new, improved joint offer if their bid is not accepted.  
The buyer screen shows the buyers the assigned willingness-to-pay (WTP) value of the 
product they are asked to buy. With the beginning of each round, a buyer can initiate a bid, or 
wait and join an existing bid price. When the requisite number of buyers, determined by the 
group size manipulation, a group offer was generated and immediately forwarded to the seller for 
review. In any case, a new bid price can be proposed at any time. Buyers observe the market by 




transaction occurs, i.e. a seller accepts an offer from the buyer group; the buyer’s profit will be 
calculated and shown to the participants. In the treatment with a private communication channel 
buyers are able to exchange text messages via an instant message type of communication box.  
In each period of the ten repeated rounds of the experiment, the buyers are given different 
WTP values, generated randomly, and rotated to buyers sequentially in each period (as detailed 
in Appendix B). First, 10 random integer numbers are generated between 25 and 100 from a 
uniform distribution. These 10 numbers are then recorded and reused for all of the 10 repeated 
rounds for all experimental groups in order to experimentally control for WTP effects.  In the 
first round of the experiment, the first five numbers are assigned to the five group buyers 
sequentially, and in the second round, the next five values, starting from the second number, are 
assigned to the buyers sequentially, and so on. This WTP rotation method ensures that every 
buyer receives all of the ten generated values over the course of the ten repeated rounds and, 
additionally, that for any given round all buyers have also different values.  
Measures 
Specifically, this study looks at all experimental sessions in which, one experimental 
treatment variable, presence of the communication channel, is manipulated. Dependent variables 
include the number of price messages, the number of positive messages and the number of 
negative messages, while independent variables include group-level profit, measured as average 
buyer profit within groups, and group performance, investigated in terms of time for group task 
completion. The group task is measured, making a deal with the seller, by analyzing the time the 









Pricing Messages  
 
Dependent Variables Buyer profit  Task completion (accepted bid) 
 
Control Variables Time pressure  Experimental periods (P1,  P2, …, P10 = 0 or 1) 
Experimental Session 
Table 26. Experimental variables 
Descriptive analysis  
 The experiment was carried out with a total of 97 groups. Groups were comprised of 2, 4, 
5, and 8 potential buyers. Buyers would be allowed to place a bid on a product, if the requisite 
number of buyers agreeing on a price as met. Bids could be placed with 2, 3 or 4 buyers.  Data 
was collected from each group over 10 rounds of the collective bidding.  Out of the 970 rounds 
over the 97 groups, 48 groups were provided with a communication channel in which to send 
messages to other bidders.   
2123 messages were collected over the 480 rounds of bidding from 209 bidders, for an average 
of 10.15 messages per buyer. Table 27 shows the number of messages by bidder group size.  
Bidder Group size 2 3 4 Total 
Groups with Communication (Total 
Groups) 






Messages 397 590 1136 2123 
Table 27. Message count descriptives 
Emotional Messages 
 The analysis of the message content focused on emotional messages, i.e. positive or 




students, were given the list of messages and asked to rate each message as a positive message or 
a negative message, with respect to emotion. Sample messages are provided in table 28 below.  
 
Positive Negative 
1 hey okay low ball 
2 lets keep it up lol damn you sellers 
3 Good start okdont bid now. anyone 
4 wtf? lol We have to work together! 
5 lol  okdont bid now. anyone 
6 lmao theyre money hungry 
7 prob loll ihate 16 
8 haha we're going to lose money 
9 ha DONT CHILL! 
10 17 looks beautifull seller :) let's not buy anything next round 
11 ^yes! stop bidding they are maximize profits 
Table 28. Examples of emotional messages 
 After the raters conducted their analysis, Cohen’s Kappa was calculated to examine the 
interrater reliability for the positive and negative messages.  The interrater reliability for positive 
messages was .73, and the reliability measure for negative messages was .70, both of which are 
interpreted as “good agreement” according to the rating scale kappa. Once agreement was 
determined, the following table summarizes the results.  
 Coder 1 Coder2 Combined 
Agreement 
Reliability 
Positive 111 119 86 .73 
Negative 284 328 227 .70 
Table 29. Summary statistics of emotional messages 
 With the combined messages, the goal was to determine the effect of any on average 
profit, or time to completion. First, two ANOVA analyses were conducted to see if there were 
any differences between the different group sizes, and the average number of positive or negative 
messages per buyer in each group (2, 3, 4). The ANOVA analysis found no differences between 




 Using a regression analysis, an examination was conducted to see if the average positive 
or negative messages per buyer impacted Average Profit, or Time to Completion. The regression 
analysis included the control for the group size. The two regression models are shown below in 
Table 30.  
 Profit TTC   Profit TTC 
Intercept 43.96† 144.33**  Intercept 61.70** 114.62** 
Groupsize3 1.155 -44.98  Groupsize3 11.64 -36.49 
Groupsize4 -17.56 12.48  Groupsize4 -12.80 11.80 
Positive 4.70 .46  Negative -3.88 8.5* 
F .899 1.526  F 1.427 4.98** 
Adj R2 .000 .090  Adj R2 .005 .314 
Normality (S-W) .86 .86  Normality (S-W) .70 .70 
 ** - p<.01, * - p<.05, † - p<.10  
Table 30. Regression model  
 The regression analysis shows no relationship between the positive messages and average 
profit or time to completion. Thus no evidence of a relationship as suggested by EH1 and EH2 
was found. While negative messages appear to have no impact on Average Profit, providing no 
evidence for EH3, there does appear to be a significant positive effect between negative 
messages and time to completion (t=2.61, p=.015), providing some evidence of a relationship as 
described in EH4. This appears to show that the higher the average number of negative messages 
per buyer, the longer it takes to reach a successful group bid, controlling for the groups size had 
no effect. Negative messages, thus, have an adverse effect on group performance, as Lawler and 
Thye (1999) explained.  
Price Messages 
 Continuing to analyze the messages, focus shifted to price messages. As an economic 
experiment, it is expected that group bidders might communicate information about prices, or 
their private values, in an attempt to coordinate a purchase prices. Analysis on the messages was 




messages, 947 messages contained numbers. After careful review by the principal researcher, it 
was found that some of the messages with numbers contained acronyms commonly used in 
internet chat forums such as “b4”, meaning “before”, or “I h8 this”, meaning “I hate this”. Each 
of the messages was reviewed and 63 additional messages were removed for containing 
acronyms, common Internet terms containing a number, or only referencing a buyer, such as 
“waiting for buyer 1”, and not a price. If a message contained anything that could be understood 
as a price, it was kept. Table 31 shows the breakdown of thee messages.  
 Total  
Total Messages  2123 
Total Numeric Messages 947 
Messages manually removed 63 
Total Price Messages 884 
Ratio of Price Messages to Total Messages .416 
Ratio of Price Messages to Numeric Messages .933 
Table 31. Summary of price messages  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Profit Time Time 
Intercept 47.54** 123.32** 116.46** 
Groupsize3 17.14 -72.18**  
Groupsize4 -14.64 -4.55  
PriceMsgs .38 2.93** 1.712 
F 2.045 8.79** 2.65 
Adj R2 .082 .40 .046 
Normality 
(Shapiro-Wilk) 
.40 .40 .54 
Table 32. Regression model  
 As the table shows, almost 42% of all the messages dealt with price, and thus represents 
attempts at coordination of task completion as required for this type of interdependence task.  
How these price messages and attempts at coordination impact average buyer profit and time to 




determine the effect of these price messages base on the average number of price messages sent 
per buyer. Additionally, one control was added, group size, since the study had sessions with 2, 
3, and 4 as the buyer groupsize. The results of the regression are compiled in Table 32. 
 From an average buyer profit perspective, the regression shows that the number of price 
messages per buyer has no effect on the average profit level (F=2.045, p=.12). However, when 
profit is examined, the results show a strong positive effect, between an increased number of 
messages, and an increase in time to completion. Thus no evidence of a relationship described in 
EH5 and EH6 was found. The results did suggest an opposite effect of what EH6 described (p 
<.05). However, controlling for the groupsize may provide some insight to this result. The 
manipulation, in which the buyer group size was set at three, was the only study that had 210 
seconds as the time duration, whereas the others were 150 seconds. It is most likely that this 
result would be primarily due to the increased time duration. In order to test this, the control was 
removed and a regression was run between the price messages per buyer and time to completion. 
The result yielded a model that had no significance (F=2.652, p=.113).  
Summary of Hypothesis Tests 
 
 Positive Emotional Message Effects Evidence 
EH1 (Positive Messages —Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Increased positive messages will tend to increase buyer surplus  No 
EH2 (Positive Messages —Time to Task Completion Hypothesis): Increased positive messages will tend to speed up Time to Task Completion No 
 Negative Emotional Message Effects   
EH3 (Negative Messages —Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Increased negative messages will tend to decrease buyer surplus. No 
EH4 (Negative Messages —Time to Task Completion Hypothesis): Increased negative messages will tend to delay time to task completion. Yes 
 Price Message Effects  
EH5 (Price Messages —Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Increased price messages will tend to increase buyer surplus. No 
EH6 (Price Messages —Time to Task Completion Hypothesis): Increased price messages will tend to speed up time to task completion. No 




5.5 Discussion and Limitations 
The study combines experimental economics, information systems, emotion theory and 
social exchange theory. The study examines the effects of emotional messages and utility 
messages in the form of price messages. The study contains 6 exploratory hypotheses, based on 
the literature. It is recommended that further development of the hypotheses be conducted.  
 Price messages were thought to have some importance on performance, since Hayek 
(1947) noted that price itself contains all the information necessary, it was believed that there 
might be a relationship between performance and messages between buyers that contained price. 
However, this was not the case, and therefore, future studies should focus on the overall effect of 
possibility that price messages might have more of an impact in different ways in electronic 
markets.   
While the literature stated that emotional messages should have an effect on group 
performance, generally this was not shown to be true. However, there was a significant effect of 
negative messages on successful task time completion. The implication of this is that negative 
messages may create more hostility and anger toward the group thereby suppressing group 
performance in terms of time to task completion. This does support the literature review, in the 
sense that as positive messages were posited to increase the social exchange process, negative 
messages should hinder that process, which appears to be the case.  
It should be noted that although the messages were deemed as positive or negative, 
Parkinson (1996) provides taxonomy of emotions and that simply looking at messages in a 
positive or negative context may not be enough since emotions are much broader than the two 
dichotomous categories used in this study. Additionally, future studies should include scales 




within the context of the session and compared to the performance results. In addition, surveys 
conducted at the end can serve to validate the overall emotional state of the participants to 
determine the effect on overall performance, which could then be compared to the message 
content.  
This study contributes to the emotional and behavioral economic literature and through 
the results, advocates more studies in these messages. The results suggest that emotions do play a 
role however it is not very clear how strong of an effect are, and manipulating various elements 
of this study could provide more insightful results. Organizations that utilize social commerce 
can monitor emotions of participants and thus alter their design according to the results of these 
types of studies, specifically from this study, attempting to mitigate negative emotions. While 
generally it is believed that emotions play a role, it may be more important to mitigate the 
negative emotions. Future research might hold that emotions such as anger, happiness and 








Technology enhances communication in both speed and quantity of information and 
when aligned with appropriate tasks can improve decision-making and task performance (Dennis 
et al., 2008). Communication mechanisms are a key component of technological advances over 
the past decade with an increase in mobility and social media technologies. Coupling the 
communication effect with economic effects provides insight into how increased communication 
effects performance in terms of buyer profit and time to task completion. This paper examined 
the effects of communication on performance in a number of ways and added to the economic 
and information technology literature.  
Using economic theory as the base for designing electronic markets, the paper created an 
electronic market using intra-buyer auction to simulate a social commerce site, where buyers 
needed to aggregate bids in an effort to conduct a transaction with a seller, simulating an effort to 
counter seller power (Galbraith, 1952). Larger buyer groups should be able to obtain better prices 
and extract higher surplus from sellers, and more communication capacity should help buyers 
with coordinating their actions. The tradeoff however with larger groups for countering seller 
power is the increased coordination required. Leveraging interdependence theory it is believed 
that increased communication would positively impact the groups ability to coordinate and 
therefore obtain better surplus and be faster in forming bids.  
The information technology literature review consistently found that performance 
benefits arise in the presence of technology. Malone et al. (1987) advanced the idea that 




role of intermediaries and Brynjolfsson and Smith (2003) showed empirically that electronically 
coordinated B2C markets reduce transaction costs and lead to lower consumer prices. Clemons et 
al. (1993) argued that IT-enabled coordination reduces monitoring cost in supply chains and 
likely leads to more outsourcing and to the development of strategic partnerships with key 
suppliers.  Porter (2001) theorized that the adoption of the Internet as a coordination platform 
would tend to shift bargaining power from sellers to buyers.  Clemons (2008) posited that social 
commerce technologies like online communities, recommendation systems, and consumer 
ratings and reviews increase consumer’s knowledge about products, availability and prices.  
The experiments found that the presence of a communication channel generally had no 
effect on buyer surplus. However, one study found that competitive effects had an effect on 
buyer surplus in the presence of a communication channel. The interaction effect between the 
communication channel and competition appears to be the principal factor for the difference. 
When groups were allowed to form dynamically in a different study, i.e. buyers could form 
groups of three dynamically, no difference was found in buyer surplus. It appears as though 
communication enhance the competitive arousal factor that could lead to better performance.  
When the experiments focused on time to task completion, the communication channel 
delayed the time to completion, consistent with the literature. The increased communication 
focused attention of the buyers’ away form their principle task. Even under the presence of 
competition, the results remained the same, and thus a clear relationship between increased level 
of communication and delays in time to task completion is confirmed.  
The two points above are central to the two prevailing economic theories in this paper, 
countervailing power (Galbraith, 1952) and Hayek hypothesis (Hayek, 1947). Countervailing 




size was increased in this study, average buyer profits were not found to change. When 
communication channels were added the study found no difference except in the presence of 
competition.  It was believed that providing increased levels of communication and coordination 
would increase buyer surplus, according to countervailing power; however, it appears as though 
this is not the case. Hayek stated that price was the only thing necessary for efficient market 
operation and thus the studies here lend support to the previous studies that have confirmed this 
in different ways.  
Adding to the collective knowledge of the literature, this study also used social network 
analysis to determine if communication channels altered the structure of the network. Although, 
there was no difference between the groups in terms of buyer surplus structure, the 
communication channel did have a slight effect on the structure in terms of the betweenness of 
the network. When actors act as gatekeepers between other actors in the network the time to 
completion decreased, because these actors lie between the other actors and thus could be an 
indicator of their participation. Thus, the betweenness may be telegraphing the behavior of key 
individuals who are acting as conduits of information through their use of the communication 
mechanism. 
It is important to note however, specifically, that the network structure found that 
networks with lower betweenness tended to take longer in forming successful bids, although this 
was a weak relationship. These information gatekeepers, with or without communication, could 
in essence be slowing down the group overall. It isn’t certain why this is however. 
Additionally, while the presence of the communication channel didn’t affect the degree 
of the network, degree does affect the buyer surplus. Networks with lower degree tended to have 




that when the groups are well connected, i.e. wheel or all-channel pattern (Freeman, 1979), 
average profits increase in spite of the fact that the groups are slower, strong support. Further 
studies should examine this relationship more closely. It was also found that lower closeness 
actually aided in the speed of task to completion, contrary to what was believed. This is also 
interesting because it suggest that the closer the nodes are to each other the faster they will 
perform, even though it might be more complex to coordinate.  
Finally, the study focused on the nature of the messages. It was believed from the 
literature that emotions could play a significant role in the success or failure of the buyers’ 
performance. No effect was found with respect to buyer surplus, which confirms the long body 
of literature suggesting the rational choice theory guides efficient market behavior. However, it 
was found that negative messages were significantly related to slower time to task completion. 
Thus when buyers were negatively oriented, they may have lost focus or purposefully choose to 
delay their actions, possibly, but not at the expense of losing.  
The notion that price is all that is required for market efficiency was further examined in 
the communication channel. It was believed that an additional mechanism in which buyers could 
communicate price might be beneficial. However, no effect was found between increased 
communication messages and buyers’ surplus or time to task completion.  
The studies presented above add to the body of literature in a number of ways. First, it 
confirms previous findings, that price is the most essential component in economic markets. 
Electronic markets are not different in this respect. It further validates that increases in-group 
size do not necessarily result in greater profits. Communication complicates group performance 
by introducing a layer of complexity. While possibly providing a richer experience, the buyer 




from the principal task at hand. Task Technology Fit may provide some insight into why this 
occurs, and it would align with Hayek. Increased levels of communication are not necessarily a 
fit in economic markets because the price is conveying the same information with less noise or 
less opportunity for misunderstanding. The result is that technologies that increased 
communication may not be effective in electronic markets under certain conditions for economic 
surplus, but communication definitely plays a role in the ability of groups to coordinate, an the 














Appendix B: WTP Value Assignment Scheme  
 
 
7.7.1: WTP Values: 10 numbers, randomly generated from U(25, 100)  
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 
 
 
7.7.2: WTP Rotation Method 
Round 
Larger Group   Smaller Group 
Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 Buyer 4   Buyer 1 Buyer 2 
1 V1 V2 V3 V4   V1 V2 
2 V2 V3 V4 V5   V2 V3 
3 V3 V4 V5 V6   V3 V4 
4 V4 V5 V6 V7   V4 V5 
5 V5 V6 V7 V8   V5 V6 
6 V6 V7 V8 V9   V6 V7 
7 V7 V8 V9 V10   V7 V8 
8 V8 V9 V10 V1   V8 V9 
9 V9 V10 V1 V2   V9 V10 






Appendix C: Instructions  
 
Example Instructions for Buyers  
General Overview 
You will be presented with one item to place a bid. Each product has a specific value to you. A 
small time cost is assessed to you as the round progresses. During each round you will try to 
acquire each of the items for the best (lowest) possible price. You must work with other buyers 
to purchase the product. It requires two buyers to agree on a price before the seller can accept an 
offer. Your goal is to generate as much cumulative profit as possible, which is equal to the values 
of the products minus the sum of amounts you pay for them and your time costs. Each round will 
last two and a half minutes. There will be one practice followed by a number of “real” rounds. 
The total time for the entire exercise will be approximately one hour.  
Bidding Rules 
Any buyer may submit a bid. You may join a bid that is no greater than the value of the item. 
You may submit a new bid as long as it is greater than the highest bid.  Start your bidding low to 
maximize potential profit. New bids can only be done in increments of 1; therefore they can be 1 
dollar higher than the maximum bid or 1 dollar lower than the minimum bid. Once you join a bid 
you will not be able to remove yourself from that offer. Once two bidders join an offer, the bid is 
automatically submitted to the seller. If the value of the item drops below the current bid price, 
the offer will be removed.  The value of an item may be different for each buyer. 
 
Making Money 
The profit you earn is equal to the value of the item bought, the bid you submit for the item, 
minus the time cost you spend for it. For example, if “item A” is worth $90 to you and you won 
the item at the end of the auction with a joint bid of $65, and your time cost spent is $5, you will 
earn a profit of ($90 - $65) - $5 = $20 
 
Your total game profit will be equal to the total of all your ten individual round profits 
 
 
Key Summary Points 
• Your goal is to make money 
• You have a cost associated with the time you spend in the auction. 
• Keep a close watch on the clock especially as it counts down to the end 
• Make sure you work with other buyers to get the best possible price.  
• Remember you need at least two buyers to make an offer  




 Instructions for Sellers (Small Groups) 
General Overview 
You will be presented with two units of one item that you want to sell in an auction. You have a 
small cost associated with the time you spend in the auction. During each round you will try to 
sell your item for the highest possible price.  Your goal is to generate as much profit as possible, 
which is equal to the price at which you sell the item minus the time cost you spend for it. Each 
round will last two and a half minutes. There will be one practice round and a number of “real” 
rounds. The total time for the entire exercise will be approximately one hour. 
 
Bidding Rules 
Your product is automatically entered into the auction allowing bidders to submit bids, which 
you may accept. A bid will only be submitted to you when 2 buyers join the offer. You may 
choose to accept the bid at anytime or allow the bid to expire. The auction will end once you 
accept an offer or at the end of, 150 seconds (two and a half minutes).  
Making Money 
The round profit you earn is equal to the highest offer you accept for the item minus the time 
cost for the item. For example, if the offer you accept is $90 at the end of the auction, and your 
time cost is $10,  
you will earn a profit of $90 -  $10 = $80. Your total game profit will be equal to the total of all 
your round profits 
 
Key Summary Points 
• Your goal is to make money 
• Try and get the largest profit possible  
• You have a cost associated with the time you spend in the auction. 






Appendix D:  Experimental Screens Study 1 & 2 
Seller Screen  
 
Buyer Screen without Communication Box 
 





Appendix E: Buyer Screen (Study 3) 
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